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AFRICAN MINE LABOURERS AND CONDITIONS OF LABOUR IN 
THE MINING INDUSTRY IN RHODESIA 1940-1974
r D. G. CLARKE
i The mining industry of Rhodesia was an important component of the 
^industrial complex’ that developed after 1940. However, the proletarianiza­
tion of African mineworkers was influenced by conditions that differentiated 
it from other forms of labour mobilization typical of the urban-industrial 
economy. The features of proletarianization unique to this industry were 
promoted by the pattern of accumulation and the specific requirements of 
production. These characteristics were reflected in institutional arrangements, 
labour legislation and unionisation process. Labour mobilization under mining 
production differed too from domestic and plantation production, the other 
non-industrial sectors. The State recognized these differences in its designing 
of labour policies.
In the postwar period, the essential and defining structural features of 
capitalist mining development were: an increasing dominance of foreign 
monopolistic capital in production; the diminishing of the role played by the 
national bourgeoisie and local small-scale capital in the industry; a continua­
tion of a high level of dependence on cheap foreign African labour power in 
production despite State initiatives to localize the employment structure; the 
continued domination over African workers in the industry not only by the 
power of capital and the State, but also by a monopoly of the legal collective 
bargaining process for African workers being exercised by the artisanal and 
bureaucratic strata of the labour aristocracy (with the explicit assistance of 
the State and foreign capital); the constrained development of a semi-skilled 
class of African mineworkers; the structural malformation of African 
unionization and the consequent relative impoverishment of the African 
labouring classes.
This paper will identify these features, especially with regard to those 
which have influenced conditions of labour in mining employment. A dis­
cussion of modem changes in the production structure and the political 
economy of the ‘mining complex’ in Southern Rhodesia is necessary for this 
inquiry.
•Dr Clarke was formerly Lecturer in Economics at the University of Rhodesia, and is 
currently doing research on African income levels in Rhodesian agriculture.
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Production and Labour relations
Firstly, the industry’s relative contribution to gross domestic product fell 
(and continued to do so) after 1924.' At that time mining contributed £3.13 
million to national income, three times more than manufacturing and nearly 
30 per cent of total output. By 1943 its share was only 26 percent and in 1954 
it stood at 8.6 percent. By 1972 mining contributed less than 6 percent of 
G.D.P. However the volume and value of output had grown enormously in 
the interim. From 1924-42 the value of output (in current prices) doubled and 
it had done so again by 1954 when it stood at $29 million. Output rose steadily 
to $38.0 million in 1964 and then rose 230 percent in the following 9 years 
to a level of $90.3 million (1973). The volume index itself rose 196 percent 
during the 1964-73 period.
Secondly, the internal structure of production in the industry was 
radically changed. Gold production — essentially based on local capital and 
small workings — declined in relative and absolute significance, even though 
it has enjoyed a mild resuscitation in the 1972-75 period. In 1935 the total 
number of gold mines was 1.750.2 The peak in production was reached during 
1941 and by 1962 there were less than 200 goldmines in operation.3 The mining 
industry thus grew increasingly large-scale in character and less labour- 
intensive. The balance of economic power within the industry became in­
creasingly concentrated within the grasp of foreign monopolistic capital (based 
in South Africa, Britain and the United States).
International capital’s growing dominance in production was associated 
with increasing mechanization. The new techniques of production consequently 
facilitated a change in the pattern of demand for labour. Firstly, the capital- 
intensification process ‘repelled’ labour. Thus to 1937 the number of Africans 
in employment grew rapidly and reached the level of 90.600.4 By 1963 there 
were only 40,900 African workers in the industry. Substantial and sudden 
post-Federal expansion pushed the African labour force up to 54,500 in 1973, 
despite continued capital intensification and mechanization. Secondly, em­
ployers adopted a different pattern of (African) labour utilization. Changed 
production conditions required the development of a class of semi-skilled
iSee Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Mining Industry 
of Southern Rhodesia, Salisbury, 1945, Appendix A, Table, p.70. Data are also 
extracted from Rhodesia, National Accounts and Balance of Payments of Rhodesia 
1972, G.S.O., 1973, Table 4; and Rhodesia, National Accounts and Balance of Pay­
ments of Rhodesia 1954-1964, C.S.O., 1965.
zG. Arrighi, The Political Economy of Rhodesia, Mouton, The Hague, 1967, p.47. 
sA.M.W.U., Production of Smallworker Mines: Compiled from Mines Department 
Returns for 1962 (mimeo). For this document, and many others from the records of 
the A.M.W.U., acknowledgement is gratefully made to the union and its officials. 
«For data see W. J. Barber, The Economy of British Central Africa, O.U.P., 1961, 
p.256; and Rhodesia, M onthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., August, 1974, Table 14.
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African workers and, because of a growing manpower shortage, the absorp­
tion of a small number of Africans into skilled grades. Semi-skilled labour 
therefore had to be ‘attracted’ and retained within the industry.5 The industry- 
specific nature of many of these necessary skills meant that producers had to 
play a major part in the reconstitution of the labour structure. Labour 
stabilization and higher wages resulted. These initiatives brought employers 
into greater conflict with the labour aristocracy of the industry, especially at 
the artisanal level where the Associated Mineworkers Union (A.M.W.U. 
which was controlled by skilled and certified production workers, resisted 
attempts at rationalising production so as to maintain their privileges and 
security of employment.
The ‘repulsion-attraction’ process concentrated the power over African 
mineworkers in the hands of large producers who continued to follow a labour 
policy dependent on a cheap foreign African proletariat. This policy was ad­
hered to in order to maximize capital accumulation under conditions in 
which equally cheap local labour supplies were in relatively short supply. The 
mining industry was traditionally dependent upon a large foreign African 
labour force.6 In 1936 nearly 60,000 of the industry’s 84,000 African wage- 
labourers were ‘aliens’. Most of these workers came from neighbouring peasant 
communities outside Rhodesia in Nyasaland and Mocambique and had arrived 
in the Southern Rhodesian ‘mining complex’ after the Depression of the 1930’s. 
Their inflow facilitated a cut in real wages at this time.7 Many stayed on in 
mining employment despite the very low wages. In 1969 there were still 23,947 
foreign workers employed in mining production, nearly 50 per cent of all 
African mineworkers.8 The gradual reduction in the dependence of foreign 
controlled mines on foreign workers was aided by a process which allowed 
employers to release foreign workers slowly but only as cheap supplies of local 
labour were made available.
Large-scale foreign producers were eventually able to steadily control 
the composition of the industry’s labour force. In 1938, 30 out of 920 mines 
employed more than 300 African workers;9 by 1945 the total number of
s ‘As wages of unskilled labour increase the labourer who is doing the work of a bull­
dozer or a power shovel is replaced . . . Consequently hundreds of unskilled Africans are 
thrown out of jobs even though the operator of the machine is an African, but 
skilled artisans must be engaged to maintain the machines.’ Chamber of Mines 23rd 
Annual Report for the Year 1961, p.23 (hereafter cited as C. M. Annual Report, 
1961). Emphasis added.
«W. Margolis, The Position of the Native Population in the Economic Life of Southern 
Rhodesia, M.A., University of South Africa, 1968, p.108.
vl. R. Phimister, Decline of Gold and the Changing Composition of the Mining In­
dustry 1919-1953. Department of History, University of Rhodesia, unpublished, 1975. 
®Rhodesia, 1969 Census of Employees, 1973, Table 10 (mimeo). 
sSouthern Rhodesia, Statistical Year Book 1947, Government Stationery Office, 1947, 
Table 121.
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producers had fallen to 656 of which 33 employed more than 300 African 
workers. In 1962 there were still 33 mines employing more than 300 Africans 
out of a total of only 344 producers.10 These top 33 employers accounted for 
28,000 of the industry’s 40,772 workers at this time. All evidence indicates 
that this structural trend continued after 1963.
The tendency towards monopsonistic concentration is emphasized when 
it is realized that of the 292 ‘smallworker’ mines in production in 1962, 116 
employed between 1 and 9 employees (African and European) and 181 mines 
employed less than 25 persons." The labour policies and stategies of foreign 
monopoly capital thus came to determine the conditions of the bulk of the 
African labouring class in the ‘mining complex’, even though they were in­
fluenced by the policies of the State and the socio-economic and political 
interests of two important classes in the form of the labour aristocracy and 
smallworker-owners.
The roots of growing foreign monopoly control lay in the Depression and 
the gradual demise of smallworker capital after the 1930’s.'z By 1975 the 
control exerted over the mining sector by foreign capital was substantial. Of 
those mines falling under Part II of the Mineworkers’ Agreement (that sector 
of the industry which up until August, 1975 was subject to collective bargain­
ing), at least 27 out of 49 mining enterprises were directly identifiable as being 
owned and controlled by foreign corporations.'3 These were also the largest 
mines in the economy and accounted for approximately 50 percent of all 
mineworkers employed in 1974. All the mining companies quoted on the 
Rhodesian Stock Exchange in 1972, except for one very small holding (Divide 
Chrome), were foreign controlled.'4 These corporations had an assessed share 
capital value of $139 million, a value 60 percent greater than the value of 
the shareholdings of quoted domestic-controlled manufacturing industries 
and 35 percent of the market value of all quoted share capital in the industrial 
sector.15 The distribution of shareholdings in quoted companies was also 
highly concentrated.'6 Furthermore, foreign capital controlled the most pro-
'°A.M.W.U., Numbers of Mines in Southern Rhodesia Classified by Size of African 
Labour Force, 1962 (mimeo).
• iA.M.W.U., Production of Smallworker Mines, op.cit.
12D. J. Murray, The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia, Clarendon, Oxford, 
1970, pp.118-43.
isA.M.W.U., Mines Coming Under Part II of the Industrial Agreement (Mineworkers), 
(mimeo).
MWaddacor, Brooking and Company, Rhodesia Company Register Analysis, 1972.
l5In 1972 the Chairman of Rio Tinto claimed that 80-90 percent of the Rhodesian 
mining industry was ‘overseas owned’. See Chamber of Mines Journal, May, 1972, 
p.30 (hereafter cited as May, 1972).
,6See Waddacor, Brooking and Company, op.cit., for details on Wankie Colliery, Rio 
Tinto, Rhodesian Nickel Corporation and M.T.D. (Mangula). In these corporations 
the top 10 shareholders accounted for more than 63 percent of all shareholdings.
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fitable areas of production. In 1963 foreign controlled mining companies 
accounted for 80 percent of all gross operating profits in the mining sector.17 
About 40 percent of these companies were ‘located’ in South Africa and the 
bulk of the remainder were British based. In 1963 alone these enterprises 
counted for 85 percent of gross fixed capital formation in the mining industry 
(65 percent of it in South African based companies). The extensive dominance 
of foreign capital in the industry was significant in determining labour polices.
The managerial class in foreign enterprises was essentially trans-national 
in character, though a number of prominent individuals liked to stress the 
opposite and built up local reputations as ‘Rhodesian citizens’. Whilst always 
emphasizing the need for Rhodesia to maintain its dependence on foreign 
‘assistance’ (i.e., foreign induced inflows of capital and the prevailing division 
of labour in the international economy), minng executves attempted to stress 
the local character of their corporations. They were keen too to develop some 
local participation in the ownership of mining enterprises within clearly de­
fined limits which would not infringe foreign majority shareholder interests.'8 
This was a calculated strategy on the part of international business to make 
their control appear to be ‘truly Rhodesian’ and so meet various socio­
political objections to ‘imperial control’ that were the hallmark of an ascend­
ant populist-cum-nationalist sentiment characterizing later (especially post- 
UDI) settler colonialism. At the same time sound economic logic underpinned 
the ‘localizing’ philosophy of foreign monopoly capital. The statement of a 
former Vice-Chairman of the Rhodesian Chamber of Mines and a Chairman 
of Rio Tinto (Rhodesia), a British controlled company, epitomizes the pecu­
niary interest involved here: ‘it should not be necessary for a mining company 
which (is) recognized as Rhodesian to have to obtain exchange control per­
mission to borrow money in Rhodesia’. '9 This clarifies the position. Inter­
national corporations wished to avoid restrictions which constrained the level 
of ‘gearing up’ of capital and thereby the rate of profit for shareholders in 
foreign countries, by the regulation of access to local sources of loan finance 
from the Reserve Bank. The four conditions proposed by Rio-Tinto to provide 
a ‘workable definition of when a foreign company becomes Rhodesian’, how­
ever strict their application, would have failed to alter the balance of control
<7See C.S.O., Report on the Results of the National Income and Balance of Payments 
Questionnaire sent to Companies Operating in Malawi, Rhodesia and Zambia in 1963, 
Salisbury, 1964.
isSee the statements of Mr. R. S. Walker in May, 1972, in which it is suggested
that 25 per cent of the equity of foreign mining companies should be held by ‘Rho­
desian investors’. 
telbid. Emphasis added.
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between domestic and external shareholders in the policies of the corpora­
tion.20
The control of foreign capital at the level of ownership of productive 
capacity was reinforced by a steady increase in influence at the organizational 
level, in the National Industrial Council (N.I.C.) and over local capital in the 
industry. After 1959, the date from which the Rhodesian Mining Federation 
(the representative of smallworker interests at the collective bargaining table) 
was not represented on the N.I.C., foreign corporate interests dominated the 
Chamber of Industries and thus its negotiating strategy with labour, as well 
mining capital’s relationship with the State.
The domination of large-scale and foreign capital in the industry was 
reflected in the membership and constitution of the Chamber of Mines, the 
organizational center of the managerial system in the mining industry. The 
constitution under which mining companies operated from 1960-70 explicitly 
recognized this oligopolistic nature, so supporting large producer interests. A 
1970 amendment reinforced this control when it incorporated a principle 
giving ‘the companies . . . which have the largest stake in the industry, the 
largest say in the determination of the policy of the Chamber’.2* Effectively, 
too, foreign producers obtained an entrenched majority on the Executive 
Committee of the Chamber, which allowed this “fraction’ of capital to 
dominate the proceedings of the Chamber and also the policy of mining 
employers because only the Chamber (after 1959) had legal rights to negotiate 
on behalf of all mining employers subject to N.I.C. regulations.22
Foreign capital did not function in isolation from local smallworker 
capital, and smallworkers were not disorganized even though the Rhodesian 
Mining Federation, its principal institution, was subordinate to the Chamber of 
Mines.23 However, their organizational energies were fragmented. In 1966, 
for instance, there were seven active smallworker associations and in the same 
year an African Mining Association was formed to encourage small-scale 
African capitalism in the industry. However, the latter organization failed 
the following year and was not revived, at least not by 1975.24 The weakness 2*10
2°The ‘tests’ were: the majority of directors would have to be Rhodesian citizens (citi­
zenship can be obtained after 2 years residence); three-quarters of the directors would
have to be resident in Rhodesia; the company would have to be quoted on the Rho­
desian Stock Exchange (a number are already); 25 percent of the equity should be
held by Rhodesian investors.
ziC.M., Annual Report, 1970, p.3. Also see C.M., Annual Report, 1971, p.3. Com­
panies with the largest (combined) volume and level of employment have been given 
the largest voting power (under a specially devised formula).
22Ibid. In 1971 the 5 ‘A’ class members elected one-half of the Executive. There were
10 classes of membership (A was the largest producer class) and 100 different 
members.
23See Colin Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia, Oxford, 1959, pp.103-05.
2«See C.M., Annual Report 1966; C.M., Annual Report, 1967.
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of smallworker capital in relation to foreign capital was not based simply on 
its small size. It lay also in the distribution of local capital across a broad 
spectrum of types of mineral production. The result was that in each sector 
the individual local producers were particularly weak. In 1962, for instance, 
184 out of the existing 302 smallworkers were occupied with gold production. 
The balance produced 20 other different commodities. The total value of out­
put by these producers amounted to $5.3 million, a small sum when set against 
the $50.2 million produced by the industry in the same year.25 The political 
significance of this class, however, exceeded that indicated by its quantitative 
contribution to output. Many of these producers enjoyed connections with 
plantation production, small-scale manufacturing and commercial enterprises, 
as well as with influential political parties.26 There was also the socio-economic 
significance of the effect upon white employment. The 8,500 employees of 
smallworkers in 1962 included 322 European employees, an average of just 
over one per enterprise.
The structure of capital in the industry had an important bearing on the 
balance of power existing between capital and labour. This affected producer 
relations with the State.27 The State regularly consulted mining employers 
before proposing changes to labour legislation and other legal enactments that 
affected profits.28 In doing so it attempted to represent the interests of capital 
insofar as they were consistent with the reproduction of the existing balance 
of social forces in the system. In particular, the State sought to meet the need 
of foreign and local capital for cheap labour-power, the different forms of 
which required a close liaison between the two parties to ensure that adequate 
supplies of this commodity were made available.26
The relations between capital and African labour for the latter part of 
the period under review can be highlighted by a consideration of profit/wage 
relationships in the mining industry from 1965-72. During this time gross 
operating profits (G.O.P.) were both high and increasing. During these 7 years
« Rhodesia, Monthly Digest, op.cit., Table 27.
ae See Rhodesia, National Accounts 1972, op.cit., Table 15, where it is shown that the 
‘Work Given Out’ by mining producers has risen by more than fourfold to $12.7 
million in 1972 compared to 1963. Also see Rhodesia, Report by J. L. Sadie on Plann­
ing for the Economic Development of Rhodesia, Salisbury Government Printer, 1967, 
p.18, where it is shown that in 1965 the backward and forward linkages for mining 
were 25 percent and 10 percent respectively.
27For instance, royalties have been low. See Rhodesia, National Accounts, op. cit., 
Table 23, where it is shown that royalties accruing to the State only rose 25 percent 
in the 1965-72 period up to a level of $1.5 million (less than 5 percent of Gross 
Operating Profits).
a«For example, see C.M., Annual Report, 1971, in regard to amendments to the In­
dustrial Conciliation Act.
2»For details see C.M. Annual Report, 1969; and C.M., Annual Report, 1970.
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G.O.P. rose 50 percent, from $25.1 million to $37.8 million.30 By 1970 the 
value of G.O.P. had reached a level of $32.2 million. As a portion of gross 
output, G.O.P. increased from 48.1 percent to 50.1 percent in the 1971-72 
period and in other years was more in the 44-52 percent range. By contrast 
African wages (for all classes of labour) fell consistently as a portion of gross 
output after 1968, when the proportion was 19.67 percent, to 14.76 percent 
in 1972. At the same time the numbers of African workers increased by 14 
percent to a level of 54,000 in 1973. The industry therefore had a marked 
ability to finance gross fixed capital formation from G.O.P. In 1970 the 
percentage of the former to the latter was 54.6 percent, in 1971 it was 70.9 
percent and in 1972 it dropped to 46.8 percent. There was only one year 
(1965) in which the industry’s gross fixed investment level exceeded G.O.P.
These aggregate figures are imperfect in their reflection of the shifts in 
the industry’s class relationships. They present merely an overall statistical 
impression. The stratification found within the African mineworker class 
must be examined since it was around this differentiation that considerable 
class conflict developed.
Wage Patterns and Stratification amongst African Mineworkers
There is no doubt that the average wages of African mineworkers in 1901 
were higher in real terms than they were in the mid-1940’s. In 1901 the Chief 
Native Commissioner noted that underground labourers were paid 50/- to 60/- 
monthly and surface workers 25/- to 40/- per month.3' ‘Special’ (semi-skilled) 
workers received from 75/- to 80/- in cash wages. In 1904 it was reported that 
about two-thirds of all African miners were paid an average cash wage of 
50/- per month. These relatively high wage payments, arising from the fact 
that peasants had adequate access to alternative means of subsistence, can 
be contrasted with the 1939 and 1949 (current price) monthly average cash 
wage for African mineworkers of 26/6d and 30/6d respectively.32 On some 
mines (e.g. mica and tin mines) the average monthly cash wage in 1946 was 
22/6d.33 However, the recovery from the 1930’s Depression during the post- 
1936 period led to a general rise in both cash wages and earnings. A greater 
degree of stratification resulted as the composition of the African labour force 
changed and the unionization of African workers proceeded apace, albeit 
in a malformed manner.
soData from Rhodesia, National Accounts, op.cit., Table 5, Table 15, Table 41 and 
Table 42.
3iW. Margolis, op.cit., p.144
32W. J. Barber, op.cit., p.227. Nonetheless, Barber is still able to describe African 
mineworkers as ‘the aristocracy of the African labour force’, (p.202).
33l. R. Phimister, Decline of Gold, op.cit., p.139.
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Up to 1960 African wages were fixed without reference to either collective 
bargaining or negotiated minimum wage policies. The Native Labour Boards 
Act (1947) did not apply initially to mining enterprises, although a Labour 
Board was set up for the mining industry in 1954 on which the AMWU 
was represented.34 Bargains struck between African workers and management 
were done on an individual enterprise basis and were governed by the Masters 
and Servants Act until a Labour Board was established. Eventually in 1959 
the Industrial Conciliation Act was amended to incorporate the mining 
industry. It gave African mineworkers the de jure right to bargaining col­
lectively. At this time, however, the State’s foreign ‘free flow’ labour policy 
was crucial to ensure adequate labour supplies to meet labour demand at 
a low price. Underdevelopment of the local peasant economy, ‘squatter’ evic­
tions, the Land Husbandry Act (1951), and other rural policies, together 
with urban influx control, helped ensure a steady supplement of cheap local 
labour to producers. Nonetheless, the mining industry (especially small- 
workers) faced ‘shortages’ of unskilled surface and underground workers. A 
high level of demand for base minerals during the war, and local labour 
supply scarcities resulting from competition for labour supplies from secondary 
industry (for semi-skilled workers) and plantation producers (for unskilled 
and especially foreign workers), gave impetus to mine employers to raise 
wages.
The ‘labour shortage’ arose for a number of reasons. Having cut cash 
wages by up to 30 percent (from 31/- to 21/- monthly) between 1931 and 
1935, and not having restored the current price value of the 1931 wage by 
1954, producers found it difficult to attract even foreign workers, especially 
as the price of basic commodities had risen rapidly during this period. Small- 
workers, ‘poor employers’ and remote mines set away from the main ‘migrant’ 
labour routes were hardest hit. The military requirements of foreign territories 
in 1943 further affected ‘traditional’ cheap labour supplies from outside Rho­
desia.35 The State made a concession to mining producers by diverting some 
of the conscripted labour force away from food prodution towards base 
mineral production. Gold producers, however, were given no relief. South 
African mines on the Rand were offering higher wages and acted as a mag­
net for Rhodesian and foreign workers in the mining industry who would 
“work their way south’ from mine to mine eventually to ‘desert’ from the
“ See ‘Resume of the History of the Association’ (A.M.W .U.) in A.M.W.U., The Granite 
Remew, October, 1967, p.14 (hereafter cited as A.M.W.U., G.R., October, 1967). 
“ Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary, Department of Mines and Public Works 
on Mines for the Year Ended 31 December 1943, p.36 (hereafter cited as Southern 
Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary, 1943).
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gold mining complex in the Gwanda region so as to cross the border into 
South Africa.36
Concern at this state of affairs, which led to the policing of the Limpopo 
border, as well as to employer pressure on the State, resulted in the establish­
ment of the Rhodesian Native Labour Supply Commission (R.N.L.S.C.) in 
1946. The R.N.L.S.C. did not actually function in 1946, however, and a general 
‘labour shortage’ was experienced in all parts of the mining industry.37 
Employers had no alternative but to alter basic rates of pay, particularly in 
the labouring grades. Large-scale monopolistic producers, who had accumu­
lated large surpluses during the war, were in a good position to make this 
adjustment. Smallworkers, especially in gold mining, where commodity prices 
were fixed at the 1935 level, were less well placed. Many experienced severe 
‘labour shortages’ and, under pressure of rising costs, were forced to leave the 
industry. The effect of this chronic crisis in smallworking production was to 
‘release’ supplies of labour for other mining employers. Throughout the late 
1940’s the shortage grew. As large producers expanded their plant, labour 
demand increased, wages rose, and labour was bid away from smallworkers. 
The R.N.L.S.C. were unable to meet all demands placed upon them at this 
stage.38 Many mines had to curtail production. Higher labour costs and the 
general ‘shortage’ thereof combined to induce further mechanization. This was 
not a strategy that smallworkers could follow easily with their limited financial 
resources. Even R.N.L.S.C. supplied contractees were regarded as ‘too ex­
pensive’ by this class of producers, especially as the Commission raised its 
capitation fees between 1947 and 1953 to raise revenues to meet its mounting 
deficits on contract labour operations.39 Marginal gold mines were severely 
affected too. The rising costs of ‘rations’ and housing made matters difficult 
for local capital which was heavily concentrated in the ‘fiixed-price sector’ 
of the mineral export market. Despite the ‘shedding’ of labour in the industry 
after 1945, the mining industry continued to remain relatively uncompetitive 
in the domestic market for unskilled labour. As a result shortages were ex­
perienced on many mines up to the early 1950’s, except, however, where wages 
had risen and/or mechanization had reduced the need for dependence on un­
skilled labour supplies.
3eSee Southern Rhodesia, Annual Report of the Chief Government Mining Engineer for 
the Year 1939, Salisbury, p.5 (hereafter cited as Southern Rhodesia, C.G.M.E., 1939). 
37Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary, 1946, p . l l  Shabanie Asbestos Mine was 
reported to be short of 1,000 labourers. See Southern Rhodesia, C.M.G.E., 1946, 
p.58.
seR.N.L.S.C. supplied contractees were first allocated to mines in 1950. From 1950-60, 
23,587 two-year contract workers were allocated to the mining industry. Many of these 
workers went to Wankie Colliery. See Annual Reports of the Chairman of the Rho­
desian Native Labour Supply Commission 1947-61 (inclusive). 
ssSee Duncan Clarke, Contract Workers and Underdevelopment in Rhodesia, Mambo 
Press, Gwelo, 1974, where it is shown that the ‘capitation fee’ on 2-year contractees 
rose from $17.3 to $52 from 1947-53.
Wages did not only increase to rectify the low wage structure after a 
long period of imbalance, but were also deliberately adjusted, by some em­
ployers, as a response to general African working-class militancy. Low wages, 
inflation and social unrest in general, made employers acutely aware of their 
vulnerability to unionization and strike action. Memories of the Industrial and 
Commercial Workers’ Union, which threatened to penetrate the insulated 
compounds in the late 1920’s and 1930’s, were still strong.40 In 1947 there was 
‘considerable unrest . . .  in various districts and small strikes . . . occurred 
due to inability to obtain maize meal at various times’.41 The findings of the 
Commission of Inquiry into the 1945 Railway Strike caused ‘a certain amount 
of trouble’ in various districts as worker consciousness of the correlation be­
tween collective mobilization and higher wages became more widespread.42 
The effects of the 1948 General Strike were far reaching in their implications. 
Contract workers, recruited into the ‘mining complex’ by large employers such 
as Anglo American’s Wankie Collieries, brought a high ‘desertion’ rate and 
agitation to the compounds. In many mines there were strong links forged be­
tween the African working-class in Southern Rhodesia and that of Northern 
Rhodesia where organization and unionization amongst the labouring classes 
was further advanced, large-scale strike action having previously been resorted 
to in 1940.43 The management of some multinationals, operating in both 
spheres of Central Africa, saw an advantage in maintaining the initiative and 
pre-empting, co-opting or even thwarting collective mobilization. These em­
ployers set the lead for others in Southern Rhodesia. The success of their 
strategy is evidenced by the comparative strength to which African unionism 
developed in Northern Rhodesia as opposed to Southern Rhodesia.
These socio-economic forces created a wage structure very different from 
that prevailing during the pre-Depression period. From 1932-37 average 
monthly wages fell by up to 25 percent for Hammer ‘Boys’, Surface workers, 
Trimmers and Lashers. At the beginning of the war the monthly cash rate 
for these grades was 22/7d 44 By the end of the war 1932 levels had only just 
been restored (in current prices). In the following five years, however, average 
wages for Hammer ‘boys’ rose from 33/3d to 68/3d and for surface workers 
lrom 38/8d to 60/1 Id. In some sectors of the industry, e.g. coal mining 
(dominated by large-scale foreign capital), wage rates were well above average. 
By 1953 coal workers received cash wages nearly 55 percent higher than
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4°On the rise and fall of the I.C.U. see T . O. Ranger, African Voice in Southern Rho­
desia, Heinemann, 1970.
4<Southern Rhodesia, C.M.G.E., 1947, p.8.
^Southern Rhodesia, C.M.G.E., 1947, p.8. 
asSee W. J. Barber, op.cit.
44Data from Southern Rhodesia, Statistical Year Book, 1938, p .81; Southern Rhodesia, 
Statistical Year Book, 1947, p.105; Southern Rhodesia, Official Yearbook 1952, op.cit., 
p.523; and Southern Rhodesia, C.M.G.E., 1955, p.17.
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gold miners and employees in the mica industry. Between 1949, the year in 
which the urban Labour Regulations became effective, and 1953 average 
monthly wages rose more than 50 percent.
The same processes — mechanization, unskilled labour shortages, strike 
action (in 1954 at Wankie for example) and semi-skilled labour stabilization 
— operated in the first 5 years of prosperity during Federation to push wages 
up. By 1958 average earnings had risen to S17.7 monthly.
In 1960 the legal position on African wage determination was changed 
by the State. The A.M.W.U. obtained ‘rights’ to negotiate on behalf of all 
workers in the labouring and semi-skilled grades. Minimum wage legislation 
was introduced, but African workers were not given effective power to control 
or direct the bargaining process. Claims submitted on behalf of labourers 
were submitted to the N.I.C. by the A.M.W.U., itself controlled, under Section 
47 of the Industrial Conciliation Act, by the ‘skilled workers’, i.e. Grade I 
members of the union, an artisanal class comprising a tiny fraction of potential 
members and all mineworkers. The State and employers agreed to the non- 
democratic structured union taking over the collective bargaining rights of 
the labouring and semi-skilled classes.
The experience of A.M.W.U. wage ‘bargaining’ illustrates how the union 
was used to further the interests of skilled employees and how African 
labourers received no affective protection as a result of the A.M.W.U.’s 
activities on the N.I.C. In 1961, the date of inauguration of an agreement to 
cover African workers (the agreement previous to this, valid for 2 years as 
of 1959, pertained to non-Africans), the underground and surface workers 
were protected by minimum rates of 22 cents and 20 cents (excluding 
rations) per 8-hour shift.45 Juvenile surface workers were entitled to 10 cents 
per shift. By 1974 the respective minimum rates were 26 cents and 24 cents 
(juvenile workers 12 cents). By contrast, Grade A minimum rates had im­
proved from 508 cents to 700 cents per shift during the 1961-70 period. The 
African consumer price index increased by 3 percent per annum on average 
from 1962-74.46 Thus in real terms the minimum wages of underground and 
surface workers fell by 17.4 percent and 10.5 percent respectively. Neither State 
minimum wages nor union action in itself can account for the actual 
rising earnings of African workers from 1959-73. Indeed, if anything, the 
A.MW.U.’s policy would appear, at least at the N.I.C. level, to have had an 
adverse effect upon ‘labouring members’.
•«5National Industrial Council for the Mining Industry (Mineworkers), Agreement 5th 
May, 1961 —  3rd M ay, 1963, S.R.G.N. No. 181 of 1961; and Industrial Agreement.* 
Mining Industry (M ineworkers), R.G.N. No. 488 of 1970.
46Rhodesia, Monthly Digest, op.cit., Tables 18 and 19.
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Despite A.M.W.U. ineffectiveness, average African earnings (all grades) 
rose steadily after 1959 wh enthe level was $20.3 per month (constant 1964 
prices.''7 By 1973 real earnings (including cash, ‘rations’ and an imputed 
valuation for housing) had rised more than 30 percent to $26.9 monthly (con­
stant 1964 prices). However, to appreciate the causes behind the changing 
average wage level, it is important to identify more closely the stratification 
that took place as a result of the development of a relatively large semi­
skilled class of African mineworkers.
In 1961 semi-skilled workers (e.g. drivers, qualified assistants, gang- 
leaders, drillers and artisans’ assistants) received minimum rates per shift 
of between 3/6d and 6/6d.48 Their minimum rates wer ebetween \ \  and 2 
times those of surface and underground workers. By 1974 the rates per shift 
for semi-skilled operatives were set at between $1.00 and $1.50 for most types 
of work, but reached as high as $2.00 and $3.00 for certain tasks (e.g. drivers 
of hoists).49 These B grade employees numbered 1,994 in 1970. Another 
larger stratum of semi-skilled African workers (8,980) received minimum rates 
in the region of $0.50 to $0.75 per shift (mostly assistants to semi-skilled 
operatives and skilled/A grade workers). In the case of operatives, minimum 
rates were between 4 and 12 times as high.as those for unskilled labourers, 
although the bulk of semi-skilled workers were paid 2-3 times more than 
labourers.
Much of the increase in average African wages was therefore the result 
of this stratification. To what extent this has been the case can be demon­
strated by data from N.I.C. records regarding the numbers of workers in 
each grade50 In 1961 semi-skilled workers (operatives and assistants) were 
classified as Grade 2 workers. They numbered 4,356 who were under the 
Mineworkers Agreement at this time (approximately 13 percent of the total 
number covered by the Agreement). Grade 3 workers (labourers) numbered 
28,184. By 1974 their numbers had dropped to 24,104 (61 percent of all mine- 
workers in the Agreement). However, the numbers of Grade 2 operatives had 
increased and there were 2,207 in this category and another 11,840 Grade 2 
assistants, who together accounted for more than 35 percent of all African 
mineworkers covered by the Agreement. The rest were Grade A skilled 
artisans.
This pattern was also reflected in the case of Staff Employees, who were 
covered by a separate Agreement negotiated by the Mine Officers and
*?Ibid., Table 16.
48S.R.G.N. No. 181 of 1961, pp.16-17.
«»As per R.G.N. No. 488 of 1970 extended to 1974.
soSee N.I.C., Number of Employees 1961 (m im eo); and N.I.C., Number of Employees 
on Contributing Mines, March 1974 (mimeo).
1 9 0 THE RHODESIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Salaried Staff Association (M.O.S.S.A.). The number of Africans who fell 
under the higher wage provisions of these occupational groups also grew 
over the period. Their wages were substantially higher than those of the 
labouring classes and they rose faster.
In 1973 there were 16,460 African workers in Mining and Quarrying 
who were paid a monthly cash wage in excess of $30.SI This left 38,010 who 
were paid less than $30 in cash monthly. Nearly 46 percent of all workers 
received cash wages of less than $20 monthly and 6,010 (mostly outside Part II 
of the Agreement and employed by smallworkers) received cash wages of 
less than $10 monthly. This compares markedly with the position that pre­
vailed in 1961 when only 829 out of 47,493 African workers in Mining and 
Quarrying were paid a cash wage of more than $30 monthly (1961 prices).52 
Fully 55 percent of all African workers at this time received cash wages of 
less than $10 monthly.
Despite the general upward trend in average African African mine wages 
from 1959-74, the process of development clearly led to a differentiation. 
Most workers in the labouring grades (many of them foreign workers) con­
tinued to receive very low wages and almost no protection in the form of 
adequate minimum wages. The minimum rates for labourers in the 1970 
Agreement (which prevailed until August 1975) enabled underground and 
surface surface workers to earn (in a 26 shift month) a minimum cash wage 
of $6.76 and $6.24 respectively. After allowing for ‘rations’ (valued by the 
Chamber of Mines at $7.02 monthly) the labourer’s minimum rate of re­
muneration was less than that considered necessary to cover the costs of 
subsistence for a single worker.53 Some mines paid slightly above the minimum 
rate and provided better ‘rations’ or supplements which reduced the costs of 
subsistence that workers had to finance themselves. Others did not. It is not 
difficult to see why, therefore, ‘extra-economic’ forms of control were required 
in the mining compounds to keep workers ‘adjusted’ to the cheap labour 
system and why throughout the postwar period large and periodic ‘wildcat’ 
strikes developed into violent struggles. The 1975 Agreement, which raised 
minimum rates of pay of surface and underground labourers to 35 cents and 
40 cents per shift respectively, has not provided sufficient change to alter this 
assessment.
5'C.S.O., Wage Distribution of African Employees by Industrial Sector for the Month 
of June 1973, D L /830 /66 , 1974 (mimeo).
52Rhodesia, Final Report on the September, 1961 Census of Employees, C.S.O., 1965, 
Table 8.
ssSee V. Cubitt and R. C. Riddell, The Urban Poverty Datum Line in Rhodesia, 
Faculty of Social Studies, University of Rhodesia, 1974. If compared against the 
real wages for mine labourers in 1901-04, it would probably be true to say that 
labourers were little or no better off in 1974.
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The rising trend in average wages for African mineworkers and the 
pattern of wage stratification in the postwar period thus reflected changes 
that occurred in the production requirements of an increasingly monopolistic 
industry. Concentration in the production process led to the squeezing out 
of small producers and local capital. The State had to accommodate this trend 
by providing less for the interests of the local smallworker-owners and 
catering more for the requirements of foreign capital. In turn, mechanization 
led to the development of class of semi-skilled African operatives and highei 
wages in order to increase productivity.54 Labour stabilization took place 
as the turnover of labour in the higher grades was reduced. Most workers 
in the labouring classes, however, remained caught in the low wages syndrome 
of the past. By the 1970’s the extent of peasant under-development was far 
advanced in the local economy. This enabled minimum wages to be kept 
at a low level, a  policy in part resulting from the resulting from the policies 
of the A.M.W.U., and backed by the strong resistance of the Chamber of 
Mines to any change.55 Workers employed by small producers were denied 
even these low levels of wages protection, at least until they were brought 
under the Agreement in August, 1975. ‘Labour shortages’ in this sector did 
not lead to substantial wage revisions as smallworkers faced severe profitability 
constraints and the African Labour Regulations Act operated to reduce the 
incidence of competitive bidding amongst employers.56 The bulk of African 
workers, including many in the semi-skilled grades, did not receive wages 
enabling them to meet the costs of reproduction of their labour for employers. 
As a result of these wage policies based on ‘primitive accumulation’, many 
workers had to retain homesteads in the rural areas and seek income supple­
mentation from non-employment sources. The low-wage system was also 
associated with continued foreign migrant proletarianization, poor conditions 
of employment and ‘extra-economic’ forms of control in order that rapid 
accumulation could take place under a system of peripheral capitalism.
Foreign African Workers and Cheap Mine Labour Supplies
One essential element in the managerial strategy to keep wages low and 
below the cost of reproduction of labour was the continued maintenance 
of a high level of dependence on foreign labour supplies. The dependence 
originated from the earliest period of capitalist mining in Rhodesia. In the 
postwar period mine owners lobbied the State, with other producers, to set
s«See Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary, 1945, p.74; also C.M., Annual 
Report, 1967.
s»See A.M.W.U., Submission on Reasons for Raising the Minimum Wage Rates for 
Workers in Labouring Grades in the Mining Industry Under the N.I.G. Agreement, 
1974 (mimeo), for details on the 1974 negotiations. The Chamber of Mines offered 28 
cents per shift for labourers.
**African Labour Regulations Act (Chapter 100) 1911, Section 21.
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up the R.N.L.S.C. After 1947 the industry employed foreign contracted labour, 
a  practice which ceased only in the early 1960’s by which time a surplus of 
cheap local labour was available. Throughout the period employers hired ‘free 
flow’ foreign migrant labour as low wages for the labouring classes meant 
that the industry had to remain dependent on foreign ‘free flow’ workers, 
even though the numbers of unskilled African workers entering Rhodesia 
diminished after the ‘New Economic Policy’ of the post-1958 period.
State controls over foreign labour were resisted by the Chamber of Mines 
in order to ensure the minimization of labour costs. The Foreign Labour 
Employment Tax of 1961 did not receive the approval of mine owners, who 
applied for exemption from the tax, though it only applied to non-Federal 
Africans (at a rate of £1 per month).57 As a result of the objections raised 
against it, it was withdrawn after only one year of application. The introduc­
tion of the ‘Closed Labour Areas’ policy at the same time, upon the imple­
mentation of which the Chamber of Mines was consulted, did not have a 
disadvantageous effect upon the supply of cheap labour to mines since its 
principal aim was to exclude certain foreign workers from urban employment. 
The Chamber raised no objection to this element of State foreign labour policy 
as it was not designed to hamper the industry’s ‘engagement of special classes 
of labour’.58 However it did continue to resist other pressures from the State 
on its foreign labour policy.59 By 1965 the industry was still 60 percent de­
pendent on foreign African workers, 20 percent of whom came from outside 
the ex-Federal territories of Malawi and Zambia.80 Mining employment policy 
had changed by this stage in order to accommodate gradually the need to 
cope with rising domestic unemployment without jeopardizing cheap labour 
supplies. A number of large mines adopted a policy giving preferences to 
Rhodesian applicants when recruiting. This was made easier by the larger 
number of Rhodesian Africans who were offering their labour to employers 
at rates which previously would not have attracted workers locally. The 
squeeze on the peasant economy was having effect and with the growing 
African unemployment crisis, after the establishment of a Committee to look 
into Farm and Mine Labour in 1969 by the Ministry of Labour, the State 
applied further pressures on mining employers to change their foreign labour 
employment policy.61 The Chamber of Mines was asked ‘to encourage its 
members to increase the indigenous content of their labour force’.62 Many 
mine workers resisted the pressure and kept to their previous policy. They
S7C.M. Annual Report, 1961, p .l l .  
ssG.M. Annual Report, 1962, p.12.
59See November 1964, p.25.
eoC.M. Annual Report, 1965.
61 For details on other reasons for this pressure, see March, 1971, p.31.
62C.M., Annual Report, 1971, p.6.
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argued that they ‘could not support any proposal that mines be asked to 
activity reduce the foreign content of their, labour forces by discharging exist­
ing employees’. Foreign workers (many of whom had been on the mines 
10 years or more) were indispensible to the low cost production system in 
many large mines, especially as a large proportion of the foreign African 
labour force belonged to the low paid labouring class63
By 1969 the mining industry was still recruiting only half its labour 
force locally. It had kept to its policy of allowing only ‘natural wastage’ 
to effect the foreign/local African content of its labour force. This policy 
continued up to 1974. At the end of that year an important set of events 
occurred in Southern Africa — Malawi’s withdrawal of contract labour 
supplies from South Africa, the de-colonization of Mocambique under a 
socialist government, large strikes on South African gold mines, the develop­
ment of collusion between the contract labour-supplying, perpheral-States to 
Southern Africa, and an accentuation of the socio-economic and political 
crisis in Rhodesia.64 Under these circumstances the South African government 
arranged (through the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association) for Rho­
desia to become a supplier of African contract labour to South Africa. An 
Agreement was signed and up to 50,000 one-year contractees were to be made 
available from amongst workers who, at least in the year before contract, 
had not worked in the Rhodesian mining industry. The decision was made 
without consulting the Chamber of Mines. Mine employers objected strongly 
to the State initiative since it could potentially jeopardize their supply of 
cheap labour. By December 1975, however, about 8,500 Rhodesian Africans 
had been recruited by WENELA for South African mines with no visible 
adverse effect on the Rhodesian mine labour supply position. Indeed, initial 
conflicts between Rhodesian and South African mines appear to have been 
resolved.
Conditions of Employment and ‘Extra-Economic’ Controls
The conditions of employment for African mineworkers reflected the wage 
stratification patterns and were related to production requirements. For 
employers to maximize profits and reduce labour costs, African workers — 
especially in the labouring grades — had to experience austere conditions of 
employment. Many of these conditions were designed to ensure a high degree 
of social control by employers, allowing them to exercise discretionary power 
over the large non-wage element of earnings (35 percent of earnings was paid
esSee C M .]., March, 1974, p.21, where it is noted that there were ‘still a number of 
mines with an alien “content” in excess of 75 percent’.
«4See the following sources as well as Chapter 4: Rhodesia Herald, 6 November, 1974; 
Rhodesia Herald, 7 November 1974; and Business Herald, 14 November, 1974.
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in kind in 1971)6S Payment in kind accrued to workers through various ‘extra 
wage’ relationships with employers so ‘tying’ low wage workers to mining 
employment.
Various non-wage benefits, which accrued directly to workers, and over 
which management had no control, were minimized as far as was compatible 
with minimum statutory or socio-economic requirements. These were: pension 
benefits, sick leave provisions and accident and death benefits.
Prior to 1959 there were no statutory provisions made for gratuities or 
pensions for African mineworkers and few employers provided these benefits. 
Smallworkers in particular almost wholly avoided these labour costs since 
they were exempted from Part II of the Mineworkers Agreement. When they 
were brought under the Agreement the statutes provided were small — for 
example, $20 for a worker who had provided 10 years of continuous service. 
The first Agreement covering African workers (1961-63) provided for semi­
skilled and unskilled labourers to receive statutory gratuity benefits of either 
one of two kinds. Workers who had been ‘continuously employed’ with the 
same employer (or different mines under the control of the same head office) 
for more than 10 years, but less than 20 years, were entitled to a minimum 
gratuity of £1 for each completed year of continuous service if the service of 
employment was terminated on the grounds of physical or mental incapacity 
(provided ill health was not due to the worker’s own wilful neglect, fault or 
carelessness). This meant that workers in Grades 2 and 3 who wished to 
retire before 1981 received no entitlement of a gratuity and those who were 
forced to leave their jobs for medical reasons could only expect a statutory 
provision equivalent to 2 shillings for each month of continuous service. In 
order to promote labour stabilization the second part of the scheme granted 
statutory gratuities to all workers who wished to retire once they had com­
pleted 20 years continuous service and provided they could, upon proof of 
a medical certificate, demonstrate that they were either mentally or physically 
incapacitated or were older than 50 years of age. Entitlement to retirement 
with a gratuity was thus only made possible after 20 years of work and then 
only if the worker had begun employment after 29 years of age. To qualify 
for a gratuity, if work had begun at (say) 17 years of age (service as a juvenile 
— below 17 years — was not counted), the worker would have had to com­
plete 33 years of continuous service. The provisions (£25 gratuity for 20 years 
service and £70 for 35 years employment) were of only marginal benefit to 
retiring employees and were primarily geared to the promotion of labour 
stabilization. Redundancy payments, e.g. upon closure of the mine, were de­
signed to be of minimal cost to employers (here employees of 15-20 years
^Communication to the author from C.S.O. (L S /3 /0 1 ) , 12 January, 1973.
Handing were to be given a gratuity of £1 for each year of continuous employ- 
foent).
The 1970 provisions (which were also incorporated into the 1975 Agree­
ment, and will presumably apply for some years to come) were an improve­
ment upon the 1961 arrangements — as they were in other industries — but 
not much so. All workers who had completed 10 years of continuous service 
MCeived a $20 minimum gratuity (a provision introduced in 1964). The rate 
for 20 years work rose to $80 (only a slight improvement in real terms after 
adjustment for inflation since 1961) and the 35 year award was $490. In the 
case of persons over 50 years of age the gratuity was to be increased by 20 
percent, or $2 for each completed year of service whichever was the greater. 
The same arrangements were made for workers receiving less than $30 
monthly under the Staff Agreement.®8 As in other industries, benefits were 
forced to rise to meet the growing demand that employers bear a higher 
portion of the costs of post-employment subsistence consumption.
Benefits and pensions for semi-skilled workers were substantially better 
than those paid to the labouring classes.67 This reflected the degree of diffi­
culty employers had in attracting and replacing these workers in production 
under conditions of expansion, the need to provide for permanent labour 
stabilization outside of the reserves, and the greater bargaining power of the 
semi-skilled grades in the A.M.W.U. From 1959-68 these workers (Grades B 
and C) were excluded, like labourers, from the Mining Industry Pension Fund 
by the stipulation that only workers who received more than $60 fell under 
the provisions of the Fund. Before 1959 Africans were not eligible for the 
Fund Agreement negotiated by the A.M.W.U. and M.O.S.S.A. with the 
Chamber of Mines in 1952. The Rhodesian Mines Benefit Fund, negotiated 
at the N.I.C., was introduced to cope with the needs of the upper stratum 
of the African mineworker class who earned between $30 and $60 per 
month (i.e. $1.20 and $2.35 per shift). The Benefit Fund thus catered specific­
ally for semi-skilled operatives and staff and deliberately excluded lower 
paid assistants and labourers. At the outset only 1,600 members were in­
corporated in the Fund. By 1974 there were 2,500 members. The benefits to 
members excluded those previously provided under the old gratuities system. 
Provision was made for upward class mobility so that once workers’ earnings 
exceeded $60 monthly they became eligible for the N.I.C. Pension Fund.
In the case of accident or death the provisions of the Workmen’s Com­
pensation Act applied.68 The Act became ‘non-racial’ after 1959, but the
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««See Industrial Agreement: Mining Industry (Staff Employees) ,  Government Notice 
No. 68 of 1972).
«’ See N.I.C. Rhodesian Mines Benefit Fund, 1974.
«*See Workmen’s Compensation Act (Chapter 248) 1959.
1 9 6 THE RHODESIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
practical application of its provisions had the effect of gearing benefits to 
the inequalitarian wage structure. This was disadvantageous for the lower 
Strata of the labour force and in the case of the mining industry the effect 
was to reduce the costs of compensation paid by the State (but funded by 
employers under Section 87), especially in the case of serious accidents which 
were most prevalent amongst the labouring classes.
The death, disease and accident rate among African workers in Rhodesian 
mines was ‘traditionally’ extremely high even though it fell later from its high 
pre-war levels.69 In 1930, for example, the death rate per mille from disease 
was 15.15 and from accidents 2.16.70 The resultant death rate per mille for 
disease and accident was thus 17.31 for Africans as against 7.36 for Euro­
pean workers. At this time 69 percent of all African workers experienced 
some kind of disease and 28 percent were prey to accident in each year.
These levels remained high whilst ‘rations’ remained sparse, labour was 
plentiful, wage costs were low, and there was little employer or State incentive 
to invest in hospital facilities. It was only with the rise in wage rates after 
1938 that conditions changed markedly. By 1946 the death rate per mille 
for disease and accident was down to 8.52 per annum though the African 
accident rate was still much higher than that of whites. By 1974 the fatality 
rate was even lower largely due to improved medication, higher wages, and 
the decline in the relative importance of the labouring class as mechanization 
was extended. Mining was still hazardous for African workers, however, as 
demonstrated by the Wankie disaster of 1972, in which over 400 Africans lost 
their lives.71 Indeed, as regards medical facilities, mines took considerably 
greater measures to ensure the health of their labour force as many more 
workers became semi-skilled and not easily replaceable in production at short 
notice. The ‘pool’ of casual day labour or unemployed workers that was found 
in the vicinity of most large mines usually consisted of unskilled labourers.72 
The provision of health facilities was conditional upon employment and mine 
clinics operated for mine employees (and their families in order to encourage 
labour stabilization). This provision, as with education provided through the 
employer-controlled mine school system, created ‘non-wage’ ties of dependence
69See I. R. Phimister, African Labour Conditions, Department of History, University 
of Rhodesia, unpublished, 1975; and C. Van Onselen, Conditions in the Mine Com­
pounds, St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, unpublished, 1974, for details on 
the period up to 1934.
7oData extracted from Southern Rhodesia, Statistical Year Book 1942, Tables 123, 124, 
and 125.
7iFor details see A.M.W.U., G.R., October, 1973; also C.M., Annual Report, 1972, p.5, 
where it is noted that there was no difficulty in meeting the ‘shortage’ created by the 
disaster.
72The Unemployment Insurance Bill was opposed by the Chamber of Mines. See C.M., 
Annual Report, 1962, p.12.
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between workers and the mining enterprise and enabled ‘extra-economic’ 
forms of social control to be applied by management.73
Paternalist labour policies were central to the employer strategy of 
keeping workers ‘tied’ within the confines of a cheap labour system. Such a 
system provided a greater degree of social control over labour than would 
have been possible under a system of pure wage-relations. In the 1930’s and 
1940’s, for instance, employers widely advertised their paternalist benefits for 
labour in journals such as the Bantu Mirror in order to demonstrate the 
superior quality of mine life as compared to those conditions which pertained 
on farms and in South Africa. The Cam and Motor mine in 1938 claimed 
that its 2,250 workers were all ‘happy’, comfortably housed and well-fed.74 
The Globe and Phoenix laid stress on its schools, sports facilities, Native 
Welfare Society, and the opportunity for juveniles (between 8-12 years) to 
engage in ‘lightwork’ for 1/- to 5/- monthly (including food, uniforms and 
blankets). No Sunday work took place on the mine which boasted its own 
‘hospital’, its own ‘African leaders’ and 200 married housing units for its 
1000 male workers. Wankie Collieries, with a population of 7,387 Africans, 
(1,390 females and 1,719 children), emphasized that one meal daily was 
given in addition to the ‘ration’ scale, that leave was available when applied 
for, and that most workers were granted small gardens to till in order to 
supplement wages. On the Gaika Mine, workers were even given mealie seeds 
for their plots. On the Sherword Star Mine, workers were allowed to wash 
and fish in the nearby river and it was mentioned specifically that no restric­
tions were placed on where workers should purchase their commodities. The 
Rhodesian Chrome Mines, aware that the combination of low wages and the 
mine store credit system was disliked by workers (because debt ‘tied’ workers 
to the mine), advertised the fact that credit given at the mine store could 
not be marked on the worker’s ticket. Similarly, the Wanderer Mine promised 
not to deduct store debts from the pay packet. Nearly all mines provided 
beer halls for recreation and simultaneously enforced severe restrictions on the 
‘illegal’ petty production of local brews.
These and other long standing practices continued to prevail in mining 
compounds. Moyo, for instance, has written on the conditions a t Shabanie 
Mine in the 1960’s and has shown how paternalism was functional to the 
low wage system and social control.75 Housing was ‘tied’ to continued em-
73The supply of rudimentary education has been an important attraction. Not all mine 
owners have been enthusiastic about supplying education, however. See Bikita Minerals 
Newsletter, January, 1967: ‘The Company is here to mine minerals, not to build 
schools for children.’
74See Bantu Mirror, 11 June, 1938; Bantu Mirror, 16 July 1938; Bantu Mirror, 13 
August, 1938; Bantu Mirror, 22 October, 1939; Bantu Mirror, 10 June, 1939, for 
details.
tsSouthern Rhodesia, Official Yearbook 1952, op.cit., p.525.
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ployment on the mine even though in some cases the ‘African mine compound 
homes were just a small degree better than . . . traditional mud huts’.76 
Houses supplied by mines were typically ‘bare, dark and ugy’, without lighting, 
washing facilities or furnishings. Often they were built by workers them­
selves.77 Tenure was related to the job and loss of employment meant not 
only loss of subsistence but immediate loss of accommodation for the worker 
and his family.78 Similar provisions applied in respect of school education 
for the children of mineworkers. The semi-skilled grades often obtained slightly 
better conditions, privileges and fringe benefits. Inside the compound, the 
authority of mine management remained dominant and, through compound 
policemen and policewomen, substantial control was exercised over the daily 
lives of workers.79
Some of the extremely rigorous controls that characterized the pre-war 
compound systems in Rhodesia were relaxed or removed as the needs of 
different classes of worker had to be accommodated, higher wages for the 
semi-skilled grades reduced the need for an austere regime over all workers, 
fewer contract workers were employed, and the existence of widespread un­
employment in Rhodesia, as well as in neighbouring territories, affected the 
formation of a ‘captive labour force’.80 Paternalist labour policies remained 
at the core of mine labour practices, however, even though the Chamber 
of Mines acknowledged that, under pressure from the State and ‘the advanced 
African’, the phasing out of paternalism was ‘inevitable’.8' Even so, retention 
of the system was still necessary to regulate the unskilled labouring classes 
and provide ‘extra-economic’ forms of control over ‘illegal’ labour organiza­
tion, ‘wildcat’ strikers, and frustrated low-wage workers. The ‘ticket system’ 
was done away with by all but the smallest mines or the most ‘unprogressive’ 
employers. Social welfare departments became ‘Africanized’ on a number 
of mines. Economic rentals were charged for housing in certain cases (after 
first raising wages and ensuring satisfactory provisions for the termination of 
leases) and the ‘rations’ system, a source of conflict with nearly all African 
workers from before the war, was converted, by some larger mines, into a 
system whereby workers could elect to take stipulated cash payments in lieu.
t t lb id .,  p.109.
77Southern Rhodesia, Official Yearbook 1952, op.cit., p.525.
7eSee A.M.W.U., Minutes of the 32nd Annual General Meeting, 1973, p.16 (mimeo), 
for complaints about this aspect of housing policy.
79See Edgar Moyo, op.cit., for details. Also see Charles Van Onselen, Sex and Social 
Control in the Rhodesian Mine Compounds, 1900-1933, Workshop on the Economic 
and Social History of Southern Africa, Oxford University, 1974 (mimeo), for a useful 
historical perspective.
eoThe phrase is that of the President of the A.M.W.U. (Mr. H. B. Bloomfield) in 
Rhodesia Herald, 3 December, 1974.
etC.M., Annual Report, 1961, p.23.
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These conditions did not apply on all mines and even where they applied, 
social control over workers by management was not dispensed with.
Employer insistence on the ‘ration’ system was deeply resented by African 
workers. It not only made workers and their families dependent on manage­
ment for food, but also enabled many mines to lower labour costs by dis­
criminating in ‘rations’ allocations against married workers. Prior to the 
1961 Agreement all decisions in respect of ‘rations’ were made at the em­
ployer’s discretion. Most employers followed ‘traditional’ practice and 
organized their ‘rations’ policy on the basis of the 1911 Mining Rations 
Scale (as regulated in Government Notice No. 350 of 1911).82 Most gave 
‘rations’ but did so uniformly to ‘single’ and ‘married workers (with or without 
dependents). As the need for labour stabilization increased, more employers 
provided double ‘rations’ for married workers.
When the 1961 Agreement was negotiated by the A.M.W.U., the 1911 
scale (marginally amended in 1935) was inserted, virtually verbatim, into the 
Agreement. These ‘rations’ included \ \  lbs, of mealie meal daily, 2 lbs. of 
beans per week, 2 \  lbs. of meat weekly, 2 lbs. of fresh vegetables weekly and 
1 lb of shelled peanuts per week.83 Employers could apply under Section 39 
of the Mining Health and Sanitation Regulations (1949) for permission to 
pay daily paid employees an allowance of not less than $1.10 per month 
in lieu of ‘rations’. The 1964 Agreement added 3£ oz. of salt to the scale, 
provided greater flexibility for employers by allowing them to provide 
alternative types of food as ‘rations’ and ensured that all night-shift workers 
were given one pint of hot soup, coffee, cocoa or tea.84 The A.M.W.U.’s con­
frontation with mine owners at the Industrial Court in 1963 also changed the 
‘ration’ system by entrenching the right of wives of Category B, C and D. 
daily paid workers to receive some ‘rations’. The solution proposed by the 
Court in an effort to reach a compromise between the Chamber of Mines and 
A.M.W.U. was eventually incorporated in to the Agreement. It placed an 
obligation upon employers to provide one half the normal ration scale (not 
actual rations provided) or the equivalent thereto, for the worker’s wife if 
the wife was living with the permission of the employer on mine property. The 
result did not in itself lead to substantial changes since many wives could not 
stay with their husband (because wages were too low or housing supplied did
^Southern Rhodesia, Official Yearbook of the Colony of Southern Rhodesia No. 3 1932, 
Salisbury, p.665.
83S.R.G.N. No. 181 of 1961. The alternative provisions allowed for rupoko, mabele, 
inyouti or rice to be substituted for mealie meal, fish for meat in the case of ‘the non- 
meat-eating races’, and extra meat in lieu of vegetables where the latter were not 
available.
et Mining Industry: Industrial Agreement (Mineworkers), Government Notice No. 398 
of 1964.
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not permit it) and employers were able to control the proportion of workers 
legally permitted to have dependents with them in the compound.
‘Rations’ thus remained a central issue in the conflict between manage­
ment and worker (as in the case of the 1964 Wankie strike) and also a nexus 
around which workers could vent grievances and mobilize others against 
management policies in general. By 1972 nearly 20,000 of the 50,000 African 
workers in the industry, mostly in the labouring grades, were still ‘tied’ to the 
‘rations’ system. Workers objected to the ‘rations’ system because they believed 
that management were maintaining the system at their expense, i.e. by reducing 
labour costs through the provision of inferior and bony meat, badly ground 
mealie meal and polluted vegetables.85 The A.M.W.U. President agreed with 
the widespread complaints coming from mineworkers. Despite this the Anglo 
American Corporation, one of the largest employers, continued to provide 
all its workers with ‘rations’ in 1972 (except at Wankie Colliery where major 
strikes had resulted in the incorporation of the cash equivalent in the wage). 
One reason why employers retained the system was the fact that many large 
mining capital interests had large investments in plantation production and 
were able to use the cheap commodities produced in this sector to finance 
the costs of ‘rations’ substistence for mineworkers. A high level of exploita­
tion of farmworkers thus enabled the cheap labour system to be especially 
efficient.
By 1970 the value of the ‘rations’ scale was assessed at $6.00 monthly 
for ‘single’ workers, (20 percent above the 1961 level in current prices). It 
remained so valued even in 1973 after the Agreement had been extended. In 
real terms (adjusting for inflation of 34 percent in African food prices from 
1961-73) this meant that those workers who chose cash in lieu of rations were, 
as a result, worse off in 1974.86 This is perhaps one reason why many em­
ployers chose to adopt the ‘progressive’ policy of switching the payments 
system onto a cash basis. It also indicates the way in which the ‘rations’ 
valuation procedure was used, partly as a result of A.M.W.U. neglect, to re­
negotiate the value of the scale and so reduce the impact of the 1963 In­
dustrial Court decision on labour costs. The valuation of the ‘rations’ scale 
at 27 cents per shift in the 1974-75 wage re-negotiations (agreed upon by the 
A.M.W.U. and the Chamber of Mines) only just restored the value of the 
1961 cash equivalent of $5.00 (1961 prices). This was because the revised
esSee Edgar Moyo, op.cit., for example. This was also one reason why the State 
regulations provided that mealie meal given as ‘rations’ should be well ground and 
sifted and ‘at least 75 percent of any sample must pass through a sieve of a 30-inch 
mesh’. RGN No. 488 of 1970.
86There are some technical objections which could be raised about using an urban 
cost of living index to deflate money wages in mining employment. It is not thought 
that these would seriously invalidate the use of the index, however.
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monthly value of the ‘rations’ scale (assuming a 26 shift month), of $7.02, 
only just met a 40 percent food price increase recorded in the African 
Consumer Price Index.87
The other aspect of the ‘rations’ scale that attracted worker objection 
was the inadequacy of the minimum ‘rations’ in meeting basic subsistence 
food requirements. The 1975 negotiated ‘rations’ value (for all single workers 
and those in that permission to have wives with them), for instance, converted 
to a daily equivalent of 26.0 cents, was only just adequate to cover the mini­
mum subsistence food requirements of a single adult man of 26.2 cents 
(updated to September, 1975 prices) as estimated by the authors of the 1974 
Poverty Datum Line Report.88 Minimum food requirements for all other sizes 
of ‘household’ unit, i.e. for most workers, were far greater than this and came 
nowhere near being met by the 1963 Industrial Court ruling.
The ‘rations’ system was extended to ‘Staff employees’ too, but with cer­
tain significant differences in application, variations which reflected the differ­
entiation within the African working class. Technically, staff employees were 
entitled to ‘rations’ determined by the ‘rations’ scale in the Mineworkers’ 
Agreement. However, almost universally, Staff employees were able to choose 
cash in lieu of ‘rations’. Here the valuation of ‘rations’ for Staff employees 
was (inexplicably) set at a  far higher level (30 cents daily in 1968) than that 
of mineworkers.89 This ‘privilege’ was functional in the system of class divi­
sion and social control in the compound. The staff workers who benefited were 
compound police, welfare workers, cashiers, security guards, firemen, clerical 
staff, health employees and supervisors — workers who formed a bureaucratic 
elite within the compound social structure and who were necessary for main­
tenance of the compound’s system of social control.
In this system, manipulation of the social order was also necessary. A 
certain amount of petty commodity production, especially when practised 
by wives alone, was encouraged by management, e.g. handicrafts.90 Nearly
87See Rhodesia, Monthly Digest, op.cit., for details of the composition of the African 
consumer price index.
88V. Cubitt and R. C. Riddell, op.cit. O f the 2,740 African mineworkers in 1973 who 
were paid in cash only, 6.6 percent received less than $10 monthly, 35.4 percent 
received between $10 and $20 monthly and only 13.5 percent were paid in excess of 
$30. See C.S.O., Cash Wage Distribution, op.cit.
esR.G.N. No. 68 of 1972.
soC.M., Annual Report, 1963, p.9. Controls have also been applied, e.g. hawkers at 
Bikita mine have had to have written permission to pursue their trade in the mine 
village. Bikita Minerals Newsletter, September, 1967.
all mines encouraged some form of food production in mine villages.*1 A 
bureaucratic class of gangleaders, compound police and functionaries, how­
ever, enabled management to control ‘illegal’ activities, prostitution, beer­
brewing, dagga selling, ‘loafers’, agitation, petty theft, and to contain the 
socio-economic problems associated with the ‘pool’ of unemployed and casual 
labourers that most mines permitted to exist inside or within the vicinity of 
the compound. These petty bureaucrats were specifically trained to meet the 
requirements of mine owners, especially the large-scale producers.92
‘Extra-economic’ controls were essential too, for State and employer 
control of collective worker mobilization, African trade unionism and strike 
action. Organized African trade unions experienced great difficulty in success­
fully penetrating the mining compounds. The nascent unionism that the I.C.U. 
attempted to foster in the compounds in the 1920’s and 1930’s was successfully 
thwarted by State and management policies. After the first major postwar 
strike (at Wankie in 1954) the larger mining employers instituted a Works 
Committee system within their company organizations (often built around 
a Village Elder system with a great stress on ethnicity) in order to co-opt 
worker pressures for change in the cheap labour system. The Committees, 
begun in the early 1950’s, functioned up to 1960 when they were superseded 
by the A.M.W.U.*3 On some mines where the A.M.W.U. had not formed 
branches, or where management had operated the Committees, they remained 
operative until as late as 1970. The Committees were a basis for African 
recruitment into the A.M.W.U. after 1959, when with assistance from the 
Chamber of Mines the (later) ‘multi-racial’ union sought to extend its 
membership to include Africans, especially in the semi-skilled grades.94 The 
M.O.S.S.A. received similar support from management. The change in the 
Industrial Concilation Act in 1959 thus left African labourers little better 
off, insofar as unionization was concerned, than before. Indeed, in having 
their ‘rights’ in the collective bargaining procedure usurped by a wholly un­
democratic union which was controlled by an alliance between the artisanal 
labour aristocracy and a dependent class of semi-skilled workers, the labour­
ing classes were dominated by both capital and the upper strata of labour.
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siAt Bikita Mine 3 /4  acres were provided to each married family unit; this amounted 
to 120 acres in toto. Maize seed was bought for workers by the management. African 
workers were exhorted to work as a ‘community’. The Company ploughed the fields 
in 1966 but required the workers to do so subsequently. The Company promised 
workers land as long as they worked on the mine. See Bikita Minerals Newsletter, 
November, 1966.
szCompound police for the mining industry as a whole have been specially trained by 
Anglo-American Corporation. See C.M., Annual Report, 1959. Among their tasks has 
been the job of regulating ‘beer privileges’. At Bikita mine, for instance, married 
workers have been allowed to take 1 gallon of beer weekly out of the mine compound. 
This benefit has not been available to single workers. See Bikita Minerals Newsletter, 
November, 1966.
ssC.M . Annual Report, 1959, p.v.
»4C.M. Annual Report, 1960, p.9.
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Ideological controls were also utilized by management to divert worker 
agitation into acceptable channels. Elders’ Committees, ethnic associations, 
welfare bodies, and even religious organizations were given substantial aid 
in their activities in the compound. The managements of certain mines also 
encouraged ethnic and linquistic divisions in the compound system which 
tended to have ethnic groups housed together.95 The fostering of ‘tribalism’ 
helped divert attention away from the common position of all workers in 
relation to capital. Management cultivated acceptable ‘stereotypes’ for workers 
to emulate. For example, in the late 1960’s, the management-sponsored 
Bikita Minerals Newsletter carried a number of profiles of ‘Personalities of 
the Month’, laying great stress on the need for workers to ‘hold their jobs’, 
for 10 years at least, avoid disputes, maintain ‘traditional’ customs, co-operate 
with supervisors, behave well, always be disciplined, work hard and avoid 
becoming ‘a rolling stone’.95 The underlying message in such exhortations 
was clear and geared to the productivity requirements of the producers and 
the social controls needed under the low wage system if production was to 
proceed smoothly.
None of these social controls could stop ‘illegal’ strikes, however, and in 
the event of these erupting, management itself was powerless. They relied 
on the State not only to make strike action ‘illegal’ in the first instance, but 
also to deal with strikers after the event. The management were fortunate in 
being able to rely upon second prop after 1959 — the A.M.W.U. The charac­
ter of this union was clearly exemplified in the attitude of its officials to 
African strikers and its boast that it had never called a strike in the history 
of the union. The union’s incapacity for action, ‘responsible’ conservatism 
and internal composition, made it unattractive to most African workers, 
particularly amongst the labouring class. These aspects of the A.M.W.U. 
can be illustrated from a consideration of its role during the two most im­
portant postwar strikes in the Rhodesian mining industry, both at Wankie 
Collieries, in 1964 and 1974.
The 1964 Wankie strike lasted 10 days. It involved a vast majority of 
the 4,500 African workers at the mine, 2,500 of whom were from Northern 
Rhodesia and were closely associated with the United National Independence 
Party (U.N.I.P.), the newly appointed African ruling party during the first 
phase of Zambian de-colonization. The strikers were joined by 500 ‘un­
employed’ persons who were allowed to reside around the mine (being given
" S ee, for example, Native Labour Advisor, A Report upon the Native Labour Position 
in the Central African Colonies with Special Rereference to Southern Rhodesia, 1950 
(mimeo): ‘The Mashona is not a mining type, the Ndebele is kin to the Zulu and 
the foreign Natives are all Natives employed in the South.’ p.34.
" S e e  Bikita Minerals Newsletter (Nov. 1966 —  July 1969 inclusive).
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one free meal daily) as a ‘pool’ of casual day labour. The strike began over 
enforced ‘rations’ and the absence of an option to take cash in lieu. Most 
of the semi-skilled workers came out on strike. The strike was controlled 
by the police and local reservists (as was an earlier strike at Arcturus Mine 
in January, 1964). The A.M.W.U. President arrived at Wankie to talk to 
the workers, even though the A.M.W.U. had officially condemned the strike 
as ‘illegal’, had disclaimed any liability or connection with it, and in any 
event, could claim less than 7 percent of the African workers at the mine as 
members. The management and the State decided to call in the A.M.W.U. 
‘to restore order and working conditions’97 A.M.W.U. officials (both white 
and black — the latter from the semi-skilled and staff grades) attempted to 
pacify the workers by asking that they return to work pending an investiga­
tion of the quality of ‘rations’ provided. The meeting at which the A.M.W.U. 
officials addressed the workers broke up in disorder. Further meetings also 
ended in rejection by the workers of the A.M.W.U.’s presence and suggestions. 
Riots ensued which were put down by the police. The A.M.W.U. condoned 
strike breaking and assisted with the supply of manpower to keep production 
going, a policy for which they were resolutely condemned by the Southern 
Rhodesian African Trade Union Congress.98 In the end, cash in lieu was 
provided and the value of rations was raised by 40 percent to £3.10.0 per 
month for single persons. A year later, in recalling what was described as 
‘an unpleasant little incident’, the A.M.W.U. President summed up the 
union’s role: ‘I fear and shudder to think what the final outcome would have 
been if no trade union had been available as a mediator in this strike. It is 
good to note that the Wankie Management acknowledge the services rendered 
by this Association’.99 This evaluation was consistent with the A.M.W.U.’s 
policy and exclusivist character in acting not on behalf of the bulk of workers, 
but as an instrument of mediation of the management and the State.'00
A parallel incident was the 1974 Wankie strike over a wage dispute. 
Again, most of the labouring classes came out on strike and were joined before 
long by the domestic and essential services staff and a number of semi­
skilled black workers did not participate. The A.M.W.U.’s officials arrived 
on the third day of the six-day strike after police action, shooting and arrests 
had failed to restrain the strikers.'01 A.M.W.U. meetings with workers were 
extremely rowdy. Ultimately, after a small 10 cents per shift offers, the strikers
»7Data are taken from A.M.W.U., G.R., May 1964; and Rhodesia Herald (June 1964).
98See the letters from and replies to T. E. Mswaka, General Secretary, Southern Rho­
desian African Trade Union Congress, in A.M.W.U., G.R., June, 1964.
99A.M.W.U., G.R., June, 1965, p.15.
tooFor an appreciation of the A.M.W.U.’s responsible role’ see R.C.J., November, 1971, 
where the Minister of Labour, who castigated unionists who advocated strike section, 
held up the A.M.W.U. as an exemplary union. 
toiFor a statement on the A.M.W.U.’s anti-strike policy and viewpoints, see A.M.W.U., 
G.R., October, 1960.
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returned to work. Once again the A.M.W.U. President claimed to have helped 
to bring the strike to an early end, much to the appreciation of management.102
Other mining strikes (e.g. at Shabani in 1972) were dealt with in a 
similar manner. The Chamber of Mines and mine management (as well as the 
A.M.W.U. on occasions) typically regarded African strikes as ‘politically 
moctivated’.103 This provided an ideological justification for the extensive use 
of police and violence in controlling strikes and for resisting worker demands. 
At no stage did the A.M.W.U. take up the demands of African strikers, 
even where nearly all workers on the mine were behind the protest. The in­
stance of A.M.W.U. passivity during strikes was only one area in which the 
union whether consciously or otherwise, adversely affected African labouring 
interests. An important reason behind the poor socio-economic condition of 
mineworkers in Rhodesia thus resulted from the nature and policy of the 
A.M.W.U.
The A.M.W.U. and Skilled Labour
The labour aristocracy in the mining industry consisted of two major 
parties: the artisanal, skilled and certified production workers, organized into 
the controlling hierarchy of the A.M.W.U., and the bureaucratic, supervisory 
and ‘managerial class’ of employees represented by the controlling elements 
in the M.O.S.S.A. Both these groups had some African members. Nevertheless 
semi-skilled African workers in both the A.M.W.U. and M.O.S.S.A. former a 
subordinate element amongst these socio-economic groups that dominate the 
formal trade union structures in the mining industry. The composition of 
these unions had important implications for both the African labouring and 
semi-skilled classes of workers.'04
The roots of the labour aristocracy’s control of the trade union apparatus 
pre-date the last war. As Phimister has explained, ‘completely divorced from 
ownership of the means of production and with only their labour to sell,
iczlt may have been wholly co-oncidental, but within a few months of the strike pay 
increases were announced for skilled workers at Wankie. Even the A.M.W.U. officials 
expressed surprise at the ‘sudden’ pay award. See Rhodesia Herald, 10 December, 
1974.
io3For an example of this perspective see C.M .,Annual Report, 1972, p.5; also see the 
comments of the Secretary of the Chamber of Mines (Mr. K. Van der Plank) in 
Rhodesia Herald, 18 February, 1972.
io4The A.M.W.U., for instance, has strenuosly attempted to limit the size of the semi­
skilled African working class. In the January, 1963 negotiations with the Chamber 
of Mines, for example, the A.M.W.U. agreed to permit 1,587 workers into Grade II;  
the Chamber wanted 4,418 workers so classified. See A.M.W.U., Annual Costs of 
Proposals of the Chamber of Mines of Rhodesia (Inc.) and Annual Costs of Pro­
posals of the Associated Mineworkers’ Union, 1963 (mimeo).
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white miners were fully proletarianized earlier than the bulk of African mine- 
workers’.105 They collaborated with management from the earliest years of 
production despite the fact that their struggle to organize skilled workers only 
resulted in union formation (in the Rhodesia Mine and General Workers’ 
Association) in 1919. An employer offensive against the union, disunity 
amongst white workers in general, and difficult economic circumstances led 
to its demise in 1923. This situation continued until the formation of the 
A.M.W.U. in 1938. This was fostered by the high demand for skilled labour 
in expansionary conditions following the Depression, the 1934 Industrial Con­
ciliation Act which gave collective bargaining rights to all organized white 
workers, the formation of a branch of the South African Mineworkers’ 
Union in Que Que in 1937, and the political power of the labour representa­
tives in the House of Assembly. In November, 1938, the State accepted the 
A.M.W.U. as having proprietary negotiating rights for the Colony. Branches 
of the A.M.W.U. were established quickly on all major mines. The con­
servative nature of the union was apparent from the outset: ‘concern over 
(African competition) led to the involvement of the Associated Mine 
Workers in the 1941 division of the Rhodesia Labour Party into two 
antagonistic groups — the “non-racial” Southern Rhodesia Labour Party and 
the “exclusive” white socialist Labour Party to which the mineworkers’ 
union pledged support’.106
After this distinctive de-radicalization of white working-class politics, 
white unionists through their unions and the Trades and Labour Council 
(which eventually became the Trade Union Congress), drifted increasingly 
towards the ‘rightwing’ of white politics in Rhodesia. By the early 1970’s 
they held a political position approximately by the conservative elements in 
the Rhodesian Front and smaller fringe parties on its right flank, such as 
the Republican Alliance. As a group they became steadily embourgeoised 
by postwar economic transformations and maintained an insecure position 
which relied upon cooperating in a restrained conflict with capital, dependence 
on the State for statutory protections, and careful intra-union control of the 
challenges from the semi-skilled and unskilled African working class. The 
demise of the smallworker tended to heighten this insecurity since the mobility 
that existed in earlier times (between self-employment on a smallworking and 
taking wage-employment) was restricted by monopolization in the industry 
and the more acute difficulties facing smallworker production in the 1970’s 
as compared with the 1930’s. This contributed to the strength of the A.M.W.U.
■ os I. R. Phimister, White Labour, Department of History, University of Rhodesia 
(mimeo), p.174. Phimister’s point has relevance also to the post-1940 position. See 
also the history of the A.M.W.U. (as published by the union) in A.M.W.U., G.R., March, 
1959; in A.M.W.U., G.R., October, 1967. 
loel. R. Phimister, White Labour, op.cit.
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which, unlike many African unions, did not depend on international aid and 
recognition for support.107 *
The internal composition of the A.M.W.U. partly accounted for its 
conservatism, Elitist character and monopolization by skilled workers. Up to 
1959 only whites were members of the union, all on an equal membership 
footing. The 1959 Industrial Conciliation Act explicitly recognized legalized 
means whereby skilled workers could co-opt semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers into their membership, but in such a way as not to impair the con­
trol of the skilled workers over the union’s affairs. Section 47 of the Act safe­
guarded this effective control by providing for different grades/classes of 
member and for the Grade I members to have a determining vote in appoint­
ing the union’s executive. Union constitutions had to be approved by the 
Minister and by law had to ensure that the skilled grades effectively controlled 
the union. The question of a simple majority of members voting for an execu­
tive did not arise since each Grade (I, II and III) elected its own specified 
number of executive members and did not vote for any others. Grade I  mem­
bers were given a majority of the seats on the executive so electing their 
members to the prominent positions of General Secretary and President, and 
thereby controlling union policy.
Annual Congresses, where union policy was formulated and passed, 
were similarly loaded. In 1973, for instance, there were 15 Africans, represent­
ing workers in Grades II and III, out of 54 delegates to the Annual Congress, 
even though the A.M.W.U. membership 1974) comprised only 1,000 Grade I 
members (out of an eligible 1,424) and Grades II and III members numbered 
4,422 (out of an eligible 38,194).’°® The large majority of National Executive 
Council members, including the President and all major posts in the union, 
were held by Grade I members. The majority, themselves drawn from Grades 
II and II, were in fact surface and underground labourers (2,600 out of a 
total union membership of 5,414), yet their claims were not prominent in 
A.M.W.U. affairs. At the A.G.M. in 1973, for instance, the wages of labourers 
were not even discussed nor any resolution related thereto considered.109
The occupational structure of the Grade I membership reflected the 
artisanal dominance in the union. Most of these members were fitters and 
turners, carpenters, welders, boilmakers, mechanics, electricians, bricklayers, 
machinists and drillers. The remainder were shift supervisors and clerical
107The A.M.W.U. has always sought international recognition, however. For details of 
its international connections see A.M.W.U., G.R., September, 1960. Nonetheless, at 
least since 1964, after the Wankie strike, the A.M.W.U. has been critical of the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, see A.M.W.U., G-R., June, 1964.
iosA.M.W.U., Membership as at March 1974 (mimeo).
losSee A.M.W.U. Annual General Meeting 1973, op.cit.
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staff. In most of these trades, the throat of fragmentation and fear of a wide­
spread certification of skills through an expansion in the apprenticeship 
system were behind worker conservativism and insecurity. Grade II members 
were dominated by semi-skilled workers employed as ‘Boss Boys’, clerks, 
lorry drivers, hoist drivers, gangleaders, mill assistants, plant operators and 
artisan’s assistants. These employees were in a position to gain from ‘African 
advancement’ schemes, ‘fragmentation’ of skilled work, and inroads into 
the mining bureaucracy, but only provided that the wage claims of labourers 
did not receive preference.
Union membership was concentrated on less than a dozen large mines. 
In 1968 nearly 90 percent of all union members were employed on 9 mines 
out of 62 to which Part II of the Agreement applied."0 on 38 mines there 
were no formal branches or members. The remainder of the mines had a 
handful of members even though on some of these the work force was large. 
The degree of unionization amongst workers correlated directly with the 
level of skill. Higher skilled workers were effectively unionized and vice versa. 
A perverse union structure thus helped thwart the movement towards demo­
cratic unionism.
The alliance between skilled labour and the State, with the complicity of 
foreign capital (which dominated the Chamber of Mines and its negotiating 
strategy at N.I.C. level), combined with the internal conditions of the 
A.M.W.U. to produce highly beneficial socio-economic conditions for skilled 
workers in the mining industry.
The minimum wage rates and conditions of employment for Grade I 
workers improved tremendously after the first Agreement in 1941. This Agree­
ment was not applicable to mining enterprises which produced an average 
gross output of less than £900 per mensem (i.e. most smallworkers)."' This 
provision satisfied white miners, the Rhodesian Mining Federation (which 
represented small workers), and large-scale capital. Under the Agreement, 
skilled certified artisans were given a basic rate of 20/- per shift and semi­
skilled workers received between 17/6 and 22/6 (e.g. assistants and hoist 
drivers respectively). Overtime rates were also included. The Agreement was 
re-negotiated in 1943, 1944, 1946, 1948 and throughout the 1950’s at two- 
year intervals until by 1959, in the last Agreement struck before the Industrial 
Conciliation Act, the certificated journeymen in the industry were entitled to 
a minimum shift rate of 50/9d. Subsequent negotiations revised these rates 
further and by 1970 the minimum was $7.00 per shift. The 1975 Agreement
itoN .I.e., Number of Employees on Contributing Mines: Number of Associated Mine- 
workers Members on these Mines. May, 1968 (mimeo).
'"See A.M.W.U., G.R., October 1940.
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set this rate at $12.00 per shift. These gains were in marked contrast to the 
stagnation in respect of minimum rates of pay for labourers. The 1974-75 
negotiations were so organized by the A.M.W.U. that their effect was to 
widen further the gap between skilled/unskilled and skilled/semi-skilled 
workers. Certified journeymen were to be raised to $12.00 per shift whilst 
most Grade II members were to receive a 50 cents to 90 cents rise."2 
Labourers' rates, as requested by the A.M.W.U., were to be set at a total of 
40 cents per shift, a level which represented only a 30 percent improvement 
on the level at which the minimum rates had been set 14 years earlier.
Earnings moved steadily upwards after the Agreement was first nego­
tiated. During the period in which the A.M.W.U. was responsible for African 
wages, the earnings of skilled workers rose especially sharply. In 1958, 
average European earnings in the mining industry were $2,822 (which would 
have included M.O.S.S.A. members)."3 By 1973 the average earnings were 
the highest of all European employees ($5,335). In 15 years an 85 percent 
increase had been achieved. The wage bill accruing to these workers had 
risen 125 percent, and although they represented less than 5 percent of all 
mineworkers, their wage payments accounted for 45 percent of all wages 
in the industry in 1973. By 1964 Grade I workers’ rates had also become ‘in­
flation-proofed’ as a cost-of-living allowance applied to all but female earnings. 
Other important benefits of contract resulted from the skilled workers’ strong 
bargaining position through the A.M.W.U.: pensions and children’s allowances, 
for example.
Unlike labourers, skilled employees were not disadvantaged by the ten­
dency of foreign capital to dominate the industry and pursue oligopsonistic 
labour policies. The high degree of union organization amongst skilled 
workers provided a substantial lever in their conflicts with mine owners. 
The price that capital had to pay for a high degree of exploitation of African 
mineworkers was the burden of supporting a necessary class of aristocratic 
workers. In the Rhodesian context they were a vital socio-ecoonmic force 
for the maintenance of a high profitable system of peripheral capitalism."4
Class, Race and the State
The union formation process in the mining industry reflected the relations 
of various workers to the production system. As production requirements 
changed, so class divisions and their racial manifestations were transformed.
nzSee A.M.W.U., Industrial Agreement: Mineworkers, Draft of Agreement as Proposed 
by Associated Mineworkers of Rhodesia, 1974 (mimeo).
"sRhodesia, Monthly Digest, op.cit.
^M anagem ent has regularly argued that ‘displaced’ workers would be absorbed into 
higher grades as ‘supervisors’. See G.M., Annual Report, 1960, for example.
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The State played a significant mediating role in this adjustment process by 
designing labour legislation to allow for the management of the system in 
favour of the dominant groups.
Up to the 1950’s there was little need for the State to concede to African 
mineworker pressure for all workers to be given collective bargaining rights. 
The compound system, together with social control provided by the State, was 
sufficient to contain African worker action, except in the instance of a few 
large strikes. However, the State was under substantial pressure to meet the 
demands of organized African labour — especially through the postwar con­
federations of labour (the Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers’ 
Union, the Southern Rhodesian Trade Union Congress and the Conferedera- 
tion of African Labour) and African nationalist pressure on exclusivism and 
legal discrimination through the Youth League, the African National Con­
gress and the more broadly based National Democratic Party.
The State’s strategy aimed at containing these pressures was to make the 
Industrial Conciliation Act ‘non-racial’, but at the same time to restrict its 
application. As far as mining was concerned it was aceptable to both foreign 
capital and the A.M.W.U. that African workers be co-opted within the 
legalized trade union system under the aegis of the established unions. Indeed, 
the A.M.W.U. had altered its constitution in 1954 in order to make member­
ship into its ranks ‘non-racial’.” 5 The adoption of the principle of vertical 
unionism in the Act allowed the A.M.W.U. to dominate the whole industry 
in conjunction with the M.O.S.S.A., the representative of monthly paid em­
ployees which had been registered in 1947.
Both the artisanal and bureaucratic/professional union built the sub­
sequent recruitment of members around the pre-existing Works Committee 
structures whose membership tended to be comprised of the conservative 
and semi-skilled side of the African labour movement in the compounds. In 
this task they were assisted by mineworkers who were equally desirous of 
containing any prospective union development amongst African workers. 
Indeed, even after the Act, the Committees continued to function, not in 
competition with the A.M.W.U. and the M.O.S.S.A., but in order to continue 
‘to train and accustom African mine workers to the recognized procedure 
and conduct of round table negotiations between labour and management.” ® 
The A.M.W.U. quickly and easily shed its purely racial image and was 
encouraged to do so by the Chamber of Mines. Although limited by law, 
the composition of the National Executive Council was changed to include 
African members as representatives of different classes of worker. The African
nsSee A.M.W.U., G.R., September, 1960, p.4. 
H6A.M.W.U., G.R., November, 1959.
Executive members, as well as branch officials, subsequently played an im­
portant part in the union.
Grade II semi-skilled members were able to successfully utilize the union 
in pursuit of their own interests. Evidence of their relative strength was 
reflected for instance in the A.M.W.U. wage claim submitted to the In­
dustrial Tribunal in 1975."7 The B class workers’ claims stood at $2.50 to 
$5.74 per shift and C class claims were $1.07 to $2.29. The labouring grades 
(class D) were to receive only a fraction of these amounts. The success of 
the A.M.W.U. controlling hierarchy in ‘managing’ the union was approved 
by mine management which regularly expressed the approval at the ‘multi­
racial’ union arrangements that existed in the industry."8
The social basis of the A.M.W.U. was reflected too in the State sanctioned 
arrangements for contributions to the N.I.C., a statutory body funded by both 
employers and various classes of worker. Prior to 1959 only white mineworkers 
were under obligation to finance the N.I.C. from the labour side even though 
there were a few non-white union members at this time. Subsequently a 
differentiated levy was imposed. In 1961 skilled workers paid 2/- monthly 
and semi-skilled workers paid 3d monthly."9 Unskilled labourers did not have 
to bear any charge. However, by 1964 levies of 2d monthly were introduced 
and placed on the labouring classes. Semi-skilled workers continued to pay 
the same amount and the skilled worker contribution rose to 2/6d. In 1970, 
after decimalization, the levies on semi-skilled and unskilled workers were 
effective raised by the process of conversion from the sterling to the dollar 
system. In effect, this levy system shifted a disproportionate burden in the 
financing of the N.I.C on to the labouring classes, as they stood to gain the 
least from it.120
The internal membership financing system again reflected the Elitist 
structure of the A.M.W.U. Skilled workers paid more than semi-skilled 
workers and the unskilled workers’ dues were set at the lowest level. How­
ever, since the union was not able to obtain ‘open shop’ provisions, whereby 
all workers( even non-members) would contribute to the union (the manage­
ment rejected this demand in 1960), it had to rely on recruitment to ensure 
revenues.'2' Given the A.M.W.U.’s inclinations and past performance, it was
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iitA.M.W.U.,Industrial Agreement: Mineworkers, Draft of Agreement, op.cit. 
neSee R.C.J ., April 1964, p.25; and R.C.J., April 1970 (notably the comments of Mr 
R. S. Walker).
usSee S.R.G.N. No. 181 of 1961; and R.G.N. No. 488 of 1970; also R.G.N. No. 398 
of 1964.
i*°Determined on the basis of the 1970 breakdown of workers by Grade in A.M.W.U., 
Analysis of Labour by Sub-Categories as Contained in the Industrial Agreement 
Mineworkers), Government Notice No. 488 of 1970, November 1972 (mimeo). 
iz'See C.M., Annual Report, 1960, p.9. On the reasons why the union wanted ‘open shop’ 
arrangements see A.M.W.U., G.R., September, 1960, p.6.
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natural that skilled and semi-skilled workers would be the principal financiers 
of the union. In crises, like the 1963 Industrial Court action brought by the 
A.M.W.U. against the Chamber of Mines (which cost $10,000), the A.M.W.U. 
arranged to draw a special levy from skilled workers, although it was also 
able to obtain $1,000 from the Miners’ International Federation.'22 The 
higher dues for skilled members were thus necessary where these workers 
dominated the union and received the major benefits from its continued 
existence. The A.M.W.U. failed in 1961 to get the Chamber of Mines to agree 
to the ‘closed shop’ principle in respect of Grade I workers alone (skilled 
journeymen).'23 This attempt to unionize all skilled workers followed on the 
failure to shift the union’s financial burden increasingly on to the non-skilled 
employees and was also designed to bolster the degree of protection provided 
for the artisanal class through its control over the A.M.W.U. The additional 
protection, however, proved to be unnecessary since the State continued to 
insist upon the retention of section 47 of the Industrial Conciliation Act 
throughout the 1960-75 period.
The security and monopoly position of the artisanal class in the 
A.M.W.U. rested firmly on the State. The politics of this class were truly 
conservative and were rooted in the populist elements of white electoral 
politics, a group from which the Rhodesian Front emerged to take over govern­
ment in 1962. Ministers were sympathetic to the A.M.W.U.’s case for protec­
tion of skilled workers. They regularly attended their Annual Congresses and 
there were close associations with the union stretching back to 1940 when 
an ex-trade unionist (Mr J. W. Keller) was Minister of Labour and previously 
had been one of the early organizers in the R.M.G.W.A., the A.M.W.U.’s 
predecessor before the Depression.'24 Union power, as opposed to foreign 
capital, represented artisanal bargaining power to a large extent in conditions 
where skilled workers and capital were in close mutual interdependence 
under the minority political system, despite the conflicts that marked the 
shifting boundaries of domination of the former by the latter.
Class Alliances: Capital and Skilled Labour
The class alliances between capital and skilled workers were not 
without their antagonistic aspects. However, these conflicts were not of major 
importance to either group as they were overshadowed by the conflicts be­
tween capital and labour in general and between the ruling minority group 
and the needs of the African underclasses dependent for subsistence on the 
‘mining complex’.
122A.M.W.U., G.R., June, 1964, p.8. 
123C.M., Annual Report, 1961, p.10. 
i2-»See A.M.W.U., G.R., October, 1940, p.5.
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The labour aristocracy had to maintain two sets of alliances within the 
system — one with foreign capital and another with local small-worker capital. 
Economic transformations in the postwar prior made the former more critical 
than the latter.
The A.M.W.U. policy towards large-scale capital was calculatedly hostile. 
Skilled workers were acutely conscious of their class conflict with capital 
especially over the threatening issue of ‘African advancement’.125 However, 
this conflict was restrained and conducted within the terms of the status quo. 
The union eschewed extra-legal action in the form of strikes or direct extra- 
parliamentary mobilization. The social relations of union members with 
management were not marked by violence, except for occasional outbursts 
of verbal abuse and temper, a situation in start contrast to the actions taken 
by black miners during strikes. The A.M.W.U. elected to challenge the 
Chamber of Mines at both N.I.C. and Industrial Court level in the knowledge 
that it could rely on some State assistance to back its claims. The 1963 Court 
confrontation, which lasted 28 days, illustrates this point. Even though the 
Court reached a compromise between the A.M.W.U. and the Chamber over 
the definition of semi-skilled work and over reinforcement of the ‘rate-for-thc- 
job’ and ‘no-job-fragmentation’ principles (the main issues in dispute), the 
union ultimately rejected the Court’s decision and was able to obtain a further 
compromise from the Chamber, the results of which were embodied in the 
new trade Agreement of 1964.126
An important part of management strategy dominating the alliance 
with the labour aristocracy has been its policy of isolating artisanal workers 
in the A.M.W.U. from the bnreaucratic, supervisory and professional em­
ployees in the M.O.S.S.A.'27 The publication of separate agreements in 1968 
cemented this division. In addition to dividing skilled workers in this manner, 
the separate Agreement struck with the M.O.S.S.A. (which after 1959 in­
corporated African monthly paid employees) had the effect of dividing the 
semi-skilled classes between two competing unions. The opportunity to play 
one union off against another increased as the Chamber of Mines became the 
sole employer representative at the N.I.C. confronting a widely disparate 
grouping of worker representatives.
The M.O.S.S.A. was a creature of the postwar period. It too began as a 
‘European’ union since at the time of inception the occupational categories
'zsSee the criticisms of ‘big finance’ in A.M.W.A., G.R., January, 1962, p.i; and 
A.M.W.U., G.R., November, 1969, where criticisms are also made of ‘Northern Rho­
desian financial capital’.
t26For details on the A.M.W.U.’s position see A.M.W.U., G.R., June, 1965, p.13; and 
A.M.W.U., G.R., November, 1963. See also R.C.J., April, 1963; and R.C.J., November, 
1963.
i27For A.M.W.U. Criticisms of the M.O.S.S.A. see A.M.W.U., G Jt., November, 1963.
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for which it was registered were white-dominated. As stratification proceeded 
within the African labour force, more Africans (after 1959) were absorbed 
into the M.O.S.S.A. The union’s membership drive was assisted by manage­
ment. Africans were quickly raised to the M.O.S.S.A.’s National Executive 
and the Association appointed the first African to the N.I.C. in 1961.129 Re­
lationships between the Chamber of Mines and the M.O.S.S.A. were more 
cordial than those between mine owners and the A.M.W.U., especially after 
the fracture in M.O.S.S.A./A.M.W.U. relations following the 1963 A.M.W.U. 
confrontation with the Chamber.129 The M.O.S.S.A. did not represent more 
workers or have more members than the A.M.W.U. at any time and it sought 
to identify more closely with management in later years, thereby breaking 
the unified front that had usually been presented to the Chamber of Mines 
at N.I.C. level. It too was monopolized by the upper grade workers (those 
whose minimum rates were in excess of $120 monthly) who, including non­
members, numbered 1,556 throughout the industry in 1974.'30 The size of 
the semi-skilled grades ($40-$ 120) which it represented was also large (1,809) 
and it had bargaining rights for only a small number (1,435) of lower grade 
members (compound police, cashiers, welfare workers, security guards, tele­
phone operators and laboratory assistants). The M.O.S.S.A. was thus com­
posed of different class interests. As with the A.M.W.U., the N.I.C. levy on 
the lower skilled grades was smaller per individual than on the higher grades 
(3 cents for those earning below $40 as opposed to 25 cents for those getting 
above $120 and 7 cents for intermediate grades) and the control of the 
Association was kept in the hands of the labour aristocracy. So too, like 
the A.M.W.U., the M.O.S.S.A. claimed to be ‘non-racial’ and the General 
Secretary engaged in an argument with the A.M.W.U. in 1963 over which 
union had been the first in the industry to become so.131
The conflict between the A.M.W.U. and the M.O.S.S.A., reflecting some 
of the class divisions in white society, stemmed from the breaking of the 
A.M.W.U./ M.O.S.S.A. ‘Pact’ by M.O.S.S.A. in 1963, an arrangement estab­
lished in 1948.132 A.M.W.U. officials always regarded the M.O.S.S.A. as a body 
amongst whose ranks and executives were ‘the future Management of Mines, 
even if they (were) not that already’,133 This ambiguity of the M.O.S.S.A.’s role 
complicated the A.M.W.U.’s alliance with them, especially during attempts by
'2eC.M., Annual Report, 1961, p.10.
'zsThe Chamber of Mines has consistently talked of ‘excellent relations’ with the 
A.M.W.U. See especially, C.M .,Annual Report, 1971, pp.6-7. 
taoN.I.C. Number of Employees on Contributing Mines: March 1974, op.cit. 
i3iSee here correspondence between the President (A.M.W.U.) and the President 
(M.O.S.S.A.) February, 1963. I am grateful to Mr. H. Bloomfield for allowing me to 
consult the archives of the A.M.W.U. 
iszSee details in A.M.W.U., G.R., November, 1963, p.14. 
ms Ibid.
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the latter to confront the Chamber of Mines. It even proposed itself as a medi­
ator in the dispute. This would have involved serious compromise for the arti­
sanal class of the A.M.W.U. In the event, the issue went not to Arbitration but 
to Court since the M.O.S.S.A. Executive would not agree to the former pro­
cedure. This was because it would have involved the sharing of costs under the 
‘Pact’ and would also have vitally affected the M.O.S.S.A.’s relation to 
management. In anticipation of M.O.S.S.A.’s dissociation from the ‘Pact’, 
the A.M.W.U. released them of ability. The M.O.S.S.A. compromise with 
the Chamber of Mines in 1963 clearly differentiated its hierarchy from 
the controlling groups in the A.M.W.U. The ex post rationalization of the 
rupture in the ranks of the labour aristocracy, offered by the A.M.W.U., was 
that it clarified issues and allowed ‘each Organization to be masters of their 
own affairs’.134
The labour aristocracy’s alliance with smallworker capital was main­
tained during this period. In 1941 there were restrictions on the application 
of the Agreement to exclude most smallworker enterprises. However, the 
A.M.W.U. threatened action to have these employers included under the 
Agreement mounted in the 1960’s, especially after the Rhodesian Mining 
Federation was absorbed into the Chamber of Mines and the A.M.W.U. had 
to find additional bargaining weapons against management in its conflict over 
job classification in the skilled/semi-skilled grades. Thus by 1963 the A.M.W.U. 
were calling for (at least) an Industrial Board to be established on small mines 
exempted from Part II of the Mineworkers’ Agreement, partly as a result 
of pressure from skilled and semi-skilled workers/members on these mines 
(8,000 to 10,000 workers in 1965) and partly to ensure stability in labour 
utilization practices across the whole range of employers in the industry.135 
The issue was subject to dispute and taken to the Industrial Court in 1963. 
The Court ruled that mines employing less than 150 persons would remain 
exempt from the Agreement. The Chamber expressed its great relief that the 
‘goose was spared’ and that 85 percent of all Rhodesian mines which fell 
into this category could continue as before.136 Although dominated by mono­
poly capital, the Chamber was not willing, at this stage, to ditch the smaller 
enterprises which together (under Smallworkers’ Associations) formed an im­
portant element in the employer class and possessed a certain amount of 
political leverage. In addition, many small enterprises were owned by large- 
scale capital and would have been adversely affected by change in the N.I.C. 
regulations.137
134A.M.W.U., G.R., October, 1967, p.10.
IS5 A.M.W.U., G.R., November, 1963, p.12. 
isaSee C.M.J., August, 1963.
i37See especially the union’s complaints in A.M.W.U., G.R., September, 1965, p.18.
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The conflict with smallworker (or more strictly, ‘exempted’) capital be­
come more acute as time passed and the basis for exempting smallworker 
mines was altered to favour capital.138 The A.M.W.U. were nonetheless very 
accommodating at the N.I.C. after 1945 in accepting all but one submission 
for exemption from Part II of the Agreement (a mine that had 670 employees 
at the time).139 They did not press the State to establish an Industrial Board 
for the whole industry in 1963 after the Agreement with the Chamber lapsed 
as a result of an unsettled dispute at the N.I.C. Such an action, the union 
claimed, also ‘spared’ smallworkers from regulation. The mechanization of 
production meant that some mines did not need to employ as many as 150 
workers and to produce a high level of output. Their low level of employ­
ment put them outside the scope of Part II of the Agreement. This motivated 
the A.M.W.U. to call for a change in N.I.C. regulations in order to protect 
siklled workers against legal fragmentation in enterprises outside the union’s 
control.'40
The M.O.S.S.A. has likewise been in alliance with smallworker capital, 
but even more so than the A.M.W.U. whose members stood to lose more from 
privately set contractual arrangements. Thus the minimum regulated condi­
tions under the M.O.S.S.A./Chamber Agreement (1968-72), for instance, were 
not applicable for those enterprises where the numbers of skilled workers 
(artisanal and bureaucratic) were less than three.'4' The basis of exclusion 
changed marginally in 1971. This provision effectively left the M.O.S.S.A.’s 
lower paid workers unprotected while higher skilled workers were better able 
to bargain individually for good conditions of employment. Also the 
M.O.S.S.A.’s closer alliance with management meant that the subject of 
small-worker exclusion was not a major problem for the labour aristo­
cracy in the Association. This because it was in the artisinal and pro­
duction tasks that the threat of fragmentation was greatest. The M.O.S.S.A.’s 
members in the upper grades were not faced with the same threat as were 
those in the A.M.W.U. As a consequence the rift between the M.O.S.S.A. 
and the A.M.W.U. widened.
In 1971 the A.M.W.U./Chamber Agreement expired and was replaced. 
A short term lease given it by both sides, providing for an extension for 6 
months, failed to allow enough time for an Agreement. The principal dispute
issFor details of the changing basis of exemptions see A.M.W.U., G.R., September, 1965, 
p .l l .  From 1940-48 mines producing below £800  in value per mensem were exempted; 
from 1948-59 mines employing less than 3 ‘journeymen’ were exempted; and from 
1959-74 exemption applied to mines with less than 150 employees. 
issA.M.W .U., G.R., September, 1965, p.19. 
n°Ibid.
x'R .G .N . No. 68 of 1972. This position was slightly amended in 1971. See C.M., 
Annual Report, 1971, p.7.
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was over ‘restrictive practices’ adopted by the A.M.W.U. resisting the in- 
sistance of mine managements that journeymen operate in dual occupational 
roles wherever possible in order to alleviate the manpower shortage that 
became acute in a climate of expansion of output and restrictions on ap­
prenticeship supply.142 The M.O.S.S.A. kept out of the dispute but tacitly 
supported the Chamber. Meanwhile the A.M.W.U. stepped up the number 
of disputes against the Chamber and even threatened strike action, a veiled 
challenge that was dropped with the acceptance of a ‘truce’ whereby the 
union would not force its members to refuse to take on work outside 
their trade in exchange for which management would not call upon members 
to take on work which they had not done before. This ‘truce’ was to remain 
until a new Agreement had been negotiated. The conflict between the two 
parties, however, became more accentuated by the skilled manpower shortage 
that developed after 1969.143 The State’s investigation into the exact nature 
and extent of the manpower shortage in 1972 was partly aimed at re­
establishing amicable relations between the conflicting parties in the ruling- 
class coalition. At the same time the Chamber took the initiative to increase 
the supply of skilled workers, especially journeymen and apprentices, along 
with other employers, particularly the Association of Rhodesian Inndustries.144 
By 1973, however, the union was also preparing initiatives. It declared its 
withdrawal from the 1971 ‘truce’, an informal arrangement which nonetheless, 
as the Chamber warned in its 1973 Annual Report, was enforceable by law. 
The A.M.W.U. thus informed the Chamber that it considered itself free to 
take ‘whatever action it considered necessary’.145 Until early 1975 the union 
had done nothing further than to force the dispute to an Industrial Tribunal, 
the results of which eventually had a binding effect on both parties and in 
many respects favoured skilled workers.
The social conflicts between capital and the labour aristocracy were thus 
complicated but essentially ‘non-antagonistic’. An alliance of mutual inter­
dependence typified the socio-economic relations between the various ‘frac­
tions’ of capital on the one hand and the various dominant elements con­
stituting the labour aristocracy on the other. These complex and dynamic 
alliances were however more intricate than suggested by the simple notion of 
the ‘deal’ struck between ‘capital and white workers’ that Arrighi and Loney
*<2ln March 1974 there were 120 apprentices sn foreign controlled mines in Rhodesia. 
All these apprentices were on 14 mines. There were 211 apprentices on 20 mines in 
the whole industry at this time. See N.I.C., Number of Employees on Contributing 
Mines March 1974 (mimeo). For employer views on apprenticeship see C.M., Annual 
Report, 1971, pp.5-6.
naSee C.M., Annual Report, 1969. The Chamber had been stressing the skilled man­
power shortage since 1959. See C M .J., December 1959.
'•*4See C.M., Annual Report, 1973, p.5. In 1961, however, the industry only trained 108 
apprentices. See N.I.C., Number of Employees, January, 1961 (mimeo).
'4sC. M. Annual Report, 1973, p.6.
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describe as the root of minority dominance in the political economy. Further­
more, the particular complexion and method of dominance by capital was 
influential for labour mobilization policies in the industry and significantly 
affected African workers.
Conclusion
The proletarianization of African mineworkers in Rhodesia was a socio­
economic process that exhibited certain unique features. Essentially, however, 
the domination over labour in the industry was rooted in the complex inter­
relations between foreign capital, the labour aristocracy and the State. This 
domination provided the means for a high degree of employer social control 
over labour and also a profitable framework for the continuation of policies 
of ‘primitive accumulation’. Not all African workers were subject to the 
same forms of exploitation, however. Stratification amongst the African labour 
force on the mines was further advanced than in the plantation production 
system. The special features of labour mobilization in the compound system 
and a high level of worker dependence on the individual employer differenti­
ated the class formation process in the mining industry. African unionism was 
malformed as a consequence of the particular conditions that prevailed his­
torically in the mining industry. The conditions of labour and union forma­
tion differed from the situation that was typical of the rest of the ‘industrial 
complex’.
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